foir_3880

FOI-R--3880--SE
most tangible result of this phase was the formation of the SCO. The second
phase involved the accelerating economic interaction seen from the early 2000
and onwards. The hitherto most visible evidence of the economic focus is the
high level visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping to Central Asia in 2013. Both of
these phases evolved as China in its overall policy focused increasingly
eastwards into the Western Pacific.
China would prefer a stable and secure western neighbourhood where its policies
can focus on supporting economic development and increasing access to non-
Russian energy imports. While Chinese state owned businesses are part of the
economic landscape in Central Asia, China is not a monolithic economic actor.
Much of business is private and overall China relies on market economic
processes, albeit with (sometimes substantial) state support. In this regard China
is not unlike other foreign actors in Central Asia.
China does not want to get involved in Central Asia’s security more than
necessary. Unlike in its policy on its eastern neighbourhood China has worked to
eliminate contentious issues that could spark conflict with its Central Asian
neighbours. Territorial disputes for example seem to have been settled with
Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan. China’s only real Central Asia related
security interest is to stop the flow of extremist ideologies and terrorist elements
crossing into Xinjiang. Economic development in Xinjiang is seen as the key to
eliminating Uighur grievances and that is why economic development in western
China is linked to increased economic interaction with Central Asia. Authorities
may however be pushing a strategy that will ultimately fail. Grievances and the
increasing polarization of society that is taking place have many causes and the
economy may not even be an important one. The economy centred and
securitized approach Beijing is pursuing in the XUAR might well backfire.
Grievances amongst the Uighur population are as much about social
marginalization and educational discrimination as they are about economic
inequality, something which is not acknowledged enough.
Afghanistan will remain a distant neighbour that China will have limited direct
involvement with. Few scenarios that would bring China to get directly involved
in security operations in Afghanistan can be envisioned. China will closely
monitor any developments that would lead to increased extremism or terrorism
into XUAR. If this is increasingly the case after 2014 countermeasures for China
will include distancing itself from the Afghan dynamic rather than getting
involved. Economic interaction with Afghanistan will remain limited as long as
instability remains and infrastructure is lacking. This is unfortunate for
Afghanistan since China is one of the primary economic powers that could have
helped the Silk Road economic region to prosper and Afghanistan to build a
stronger economy.
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