foir_3880
foir_3880
foir_3880
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FOI-R--<strong>3880</strong>--SE<br />
on anti-terror activities has been a support for the domestic Chinese approach<br />
towards the XUAR. The importance China and the other SCO members place on<br />
the terrorist threat is seen in the establishment in 2004 of the Regional Antiterrorist<br />
Centre (RATS) in Tashkent. It is one of but two permanent bodies of the<br />
SCO, the other being the secretariat in Beijing. Terrorism was not the only<br />
reason for forming the SCO, but may from the Chinese perspective have been<br />
more important than appreciated in the West. That China, despite the preference<br />
for using bilateral relationships or the UN, has chosen to invest in a multilateral<br />
security agreement with Russia and Central Asian partners underlines that its<br />
view on its neighbours to the west differs from its views on other areas.<br />
AFGHANISTAN AND THE GREATER GEOSTRATEGIC GAME IN<br />
THE CHINESE CALCULUS<br />
To policy makers in Beijing Afghanistan is a distant neighbour that mostly has<br />
had little influence on Chinese foreign policy, its security or its economy. The<br />
short border has only one crossing point, a trail across the Wakhjir pass (4900<br />
metres above sea level) leading west into the narrow, long and rugged valley of<br />
Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. Geography limits interaction and the physical<br />
threats emanating directly from Afghanistan (Wong, 2010). Yet the spread of<br />
ideology has no respect for borders and the risk that political and religious<br />
extremism will take root has been a concern for the government in Beijing.<br />
China sees the American presence in Afghanistan as a mixed blessing. The<br />
foreign forces have on the one hand addressed a key Chinese concern, the<br />
Islamist extremism of al Qaeda. On the other hand the massive Western<br />
deployment runs counter to a central policy tenet of Beijing, the non-interference<br />
in other countries internal affairs policy (Xinhua, 2013:b). The Afghan war has<br />
also run parallel to a general geostrategic shift towards the Western Pacific<br />
during the 2000’s, a shift closely linked to the international debate about the rise<br />
of China. Western suspicion and, in the Beijing analysis, politico-military<br />
overreactions have risked isolating and encircling China militarily. The US<br />
foothold in Afghanistan and Central Asia can be and have been viewed by many<br />
analysts in China as the westernmost region where an encirclement strategy is<br />
being played out. This was made clear when the SCO members including China<br />
at the organization’s 2005 summit called on the US to set a timetable for leaving<br />
Central Asia (Hu Qihua, 2005).<br />
Recent statements suggest a change in the Chinese calculus on the US presence<br />
in Afghanistan and the wider Central Asia. It is becoming clearer even to<br />
cautious military analysts in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that the US<br />
does not intend to remain with a significant number of troops in the region.<br />
Beijing now sees much less of a risk, and is less concerned that the US is trying<br />
to build a military stepping stone against China in Afghanistan and Central Asia.<br />
This view is seen in the Chinese support for the US-Afghanistan Bilateral<br />
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