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FOI-R--<strong>3880</strong>--SE Acronyms and abbreviations ANA ANP ANSF BOMCA BSA CADAP CIS CSTO CU EAEC EEU EU EurAsEC GDP Ha IJU IMU IRA ISAF LAO KAZBRIG NATO NDN OSCE SCO UNDP UNHCR UNODC USD XUAR Afghanistan’s National Army Afghanistan’s National Police Afghan National Security Forces (ANA and ANP) Border Management Programme In Central Asia Bilateral Security Agreement (US–Afghanistan) Central Asia Drug Action Programme Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty Organization Customs Union Eurasian Economic Community (also EurAsEc) Eurasian Economic Union European Union Eurasian Economic Community gross domestic product hectare Islamic Jihad Union Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Islamic Republic of Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force limited access order Kazakhstan’s Peacekeeping Brigade North Atlantic Treaty Organization Northern Distribution Network Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Shanghai Cooperation Organisation United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime US dollar Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 18
FOI-R--<strong>3880</strong>--SE A. Neighbours Each of the five Central Asian republics has a unique relation with Afghanistan as well as its own interpretation of what developments in Afghanistan post-ISAF will mean in terms of opportunities and threats. But there is room for some generalisation. The countries bordering Afghanistan in the north, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have greater concerns and are more susceptible to problems coming from Afghanistan because of their geographic proximity. Their main shared fear is that the situation in Afghanistan will deteriorate further and bring instability even closer to them, thus make already existing problems worse. The other two states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, do not have borders with Afghanistan and are therefore less concerned, which is reflected in their policies on Afghanistan. Both, however, would be heavily influenced by increasing instability in the other three countries. As a result of Soviet policies, Central Asia’s set of ethnic, lingual and religious identities defy today’s political borders. The cultural make-up of the region therefore contains multiple potential channels for cross-border influence. It is easy to think that the interests of shared ethnic groups are part of the equation in the Central Asian countries’ dealings with Afghanistan. This is partly true. Tajikistan seems to be the country with the most interaction with its ethnic kin in Afghanistan, while Turkmenistan is the least and Uzbekistan somewhere in between. This relation also reflects the differences between Tajik and Turkmen involvement in the Afghan civil war in the 1990s, when Tajikistan was affected and involved while Turkmenistan mostly was not. Today, ethnic and linguistic ties underpin political, cultural and trade ties, including drugs smuggling. Central Asia’s secular political elites, many of whom have been in place since Soviet times, seem increasingly out of sync with the region’s evolving post- Soviet re-Islamisation. Central Asia’s governments seem to perceive religion in general as a potential challenge and religious extremism, especially in its violent forms – jihadists – as an important threat coupled to developments in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not, however, only portrayed as a source of problems. It holds economic potential for its neighbours, as a market in itself and as a pathway to markets in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. The withdrawal of ISAF in 2014 brings uncertainties since it may upset the fragile regional balance that has been underpinned by the international community’s efforts to contain Afghanistan’s challenges within the country. The first to feel any changes are likely to be Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours. The following chapters will outline the interests, fears and approaches of Afghanistan’s three closest northern neighbours: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 19
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Page 6 and 7: FOI-R--3880--SE Sammanfattning Denn
Page 8 and 9: FOI-R--3880--SE Summary The aim of
Page 10 and 11: FOI-R--3880--SE Contents Preface 10
Page 12 and 13: FOI-R--3880--SE Preface There seems
Page 14 and 15: FOI-R--3880--SE Map of Central Asia
Page 16 and 17: FOI-R--3880--SE Overview The report
Page 18 and 19: FOI-R--3880--SE This study illustra
Page 22 and 23: FOI-R--3880--SE 1 How may the withd
Page 24 and 25: FOI-R--3880--SE Afghan cities of He
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Page 28 and 29: FOI-R--3880--SE the border. The Far
Page 30 and 31: FOI-R--3880--SE Oguz, Esedulla (201
Page 32 and 33: FOI-R--3880--SE capabilities of the
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Page 38 and 39: FOI-R--3880--SE 3 North-east Afghan
Page 40 and 41: FOI-R--3880--SE The Tajik political
Page 42 and 43: FOI-R--3880--SE The strengthening o
Page 44 and 45: FOI-R--3880--SE structures. Talk of
Page 46 and 47: FOI-R--3880--SE Chorshanbiev, Paira
Page 48 and 49: FOI-R--3880--SE http://www.trend.az
Page 50 and 51: FOI-R--3880--SE 4 Drugs trafficking
Page 52 and 53: FOI-R--3880--SE While the objective
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Page 56 and 57: FOI-R--3880--SE interstate distrust
Page 58 and 59: FOI-R--3880--SE 5 Why Islamists are
Page 60 and 61: FOI-R--3880--SE however, has a phan
Page 62 and 63: FOI-R--3880--SE actually not closel
Page 64 and 65: FOI-R--3880--SE people’s ability
Page 66 and 67: FOI-R--3880--SE Hansen, L. (2000)
Page 68 and 69: FOI-R--3880--SE 6 Regional efforts
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FOI-R--3880--SE nature of the Afgha
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FOI-R--3880--SE through negotiation
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FOI-R--3880--SE The Central Asian c
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FOI-R--3880--SE C. Remaining extern
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FOI-R--3880--SE A tentative argumen
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FOI-R--3880--SE 1990s (see also Mod
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FOI-R--3880--SE relationship with A
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FOI-R--3880--SE Kazemi, Said Reza (
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FOI-R--3880--SE _ttnews[backPid]=27
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FOI-R--3880--SE with system legitim
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FOI-R--3880--SE on anti-terror acti
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FOI-R--3880--SE interventions simil
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FOI-R--3880--SE most tangible resul
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FOI-R--3880--SE Samad, Omar (2013)
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FOI-R--3880--SE republics of Centra
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FOI-R--3880--SE dominate new integr
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FOI-R--3880--SE there are concentra
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FOI-R--3880--SE School of Economics
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FOI-R--3880--SE Ivanov, Viktor (201
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FOI-R--3880--SE D. Discussion As of
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FOI-R--3880--SE drugs trade in Taji
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FOI-R--3880--SE Russian policymaker
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FOI-R--3880--SE … WITHOUT THE OUT
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FOI-R--3880--SE But the competition
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FOI-R--3880--SE References (for the
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FOI-R--3880--SE Biographies Rustam
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FOI-R--3880--SE 2012); ‘Islam in
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