foir_3880

FOI-R--3880--SE
other forms of cooperation, involving, inter alia, its direct Central Asian
neighbours, for security and development in Afghanistan and its near and
extended neighbourhood. However, the initiative, given the region’s current
socio-political divergence, has been unrealistic, despite achieving some practical,
albeit haphazard and mainly bilateral, results so far (Kazemi, 2013a; for further
detail on 15 previously identified regional investment projects, see Afghan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Moreover, one wonders how the
controversial ‘Heart of Asia’ regional process, including neighbouring Central
Asia, can continue to progress if there is an imminent significant reduction of the
Western-led international community’s interest in and engagement with the
neighbourhood (Kazemi, 2013a; Kazemi, 2013b). Despite this, the regional
initiative has so far been an achievement for the burgeoning Afghan diplomacy,
backed by its key international supporters, but it may take years, if not decades,
to come to fruition, if it does come to fruition at all.
Finally, given the deteriorating security situation in northern Afghanistan (for
example, in Badakhshan and Faryab provinces where the Afghan security forces
have recently been engaged in fierce, violent clashes with a multiplicity of armed
opposition groups, including reportedly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan),
unilateral defensive behaviour seems to outweigh multilateral regional
cooperation, at least for the time being. This, however, does not in any way mean
that a full-blown spillover of Afghanistan’s armed conflict into the Central Asian
neighbourhood is likely, because the broader politico-security dynamics affecting
Afghanistan are mostly divergent from those of Central Asia (Kazemi, 2012;
Kazemi, 2013c). One should continue to closely monitor whether and how any
drastic deterioration in Afghanistan’s politico-security situation – due, for
instance, to a failed presidential election (currently slated for 5 April 2014) –
might affect Central Asia. 8 Importantly, in a converse and paradoxical way, one
should also ask whether and how a potential crisis in neighbouring Central Asia
(due, for example, to a looming political succession in Uzbekistan or rising
Uzbek–Tajik tensions over water sharing and other issues) will have destabilising
ramifications for Afghanistan.
AFGHANISTAN AND THE NON-IMMEDIATE CENTRAL ASIAN
NEIGHBOURS
Although Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are further afield both physically and
mentally, interstate relations, mainly between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan, have
been developing in an almost unprecedented manner. 9 Kazakhstan has supported
Afghanistan’s involvement in regional structures, provided economic assistance
to Afghanistan, financed scholarships for Afghan students to study in the country
and bolstered its trade relations, mainly through its bilateral commission with
Afghanistan (Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the US, 2013; see also
Kozhirova, 2013). Moreover Kazakhstan intends to further expand its
79