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there are concentrations of their own ethnic kin. This may help to revive the
Northern Alliance rather than integrate Afghanistan with Central Asia. For the
Central Asian states, expanded ties with Afghanistan bring with them the risks of
increased drugs trafficking and the export of fundamentalism and extremism.
These risks still outweigh the incentives of expanding trade, cultural exchanges,
establishing transit routes or investments in Afghanistan.
Instability in Afghanistan, and perhaps Pakistan, may return the two states to the
buffer status they had before the US invaded Afghanistan. That would exclude
integration and infrastructure projects from Central Asia southwards towards
India and Iran. Remaining landlocked, the republics of Central Asia are unlikely
to get easy access to southern ports at any time soon, which, theoretically, would
facilitate quicker integration into the world economy. In short, for the foreseeable
future, the choice of partners for infrastructure projects in Central Asia will be
Russia and China.
The threat of extremism and the risk of domestic instability will push the Central
Asian republics to cooperate more with Russia, the CSTO and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The CSTO will have opportunities to prove
itself in operations that, if successful, would increase its relevance and
credibility. Dealing jointly with shared problems will promote integration,
primarily in the security field, but also in the economic and social/cultural fields.
RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
The prospects for Afghanistan after the withdrawal of ISAF have influenced
Russian policy in Central Asia and there are now two Russian priorities:
combating drugs trafficking, and regional security. The perceived threats
emanating from Afghanistan and a potential destabilisation in Central Asia have
become major policy challenges for Russia and the CSTO. Consequently, Russia
has increased its efforts where regional security, military cooperation and support
to build national military forces are concerned. Russia is providing 1 billion USD
in military aid to Kyrgyzstan and 200 million USD to Tajikistan for an
unspecified period of time (Lenta.ru, 2013). Tajikistan can also receive 250
million USD more if Moscow does not levy duties on fuel and lubricants. This is
close to the rent payment the Tajik government demanded for the 201st Russian
Military Base in Tajikistan. The base has also provided Tajikistan with
significant amounts of weapons for two decades, which could explain why
Russia spends less military aid money on Tajikistan than on Kyrgyzstan.
Drugs trafficking is another Russian concern. Russia wants to create a
comprehensive system of regional counter-trafficking measures that are linked to
the international community’s efforts. The aim is a decisive change in the global
fight against drugs trafficking. Practical measures include layers of anti-drug and
financial security measures around Afghanistan and involving law enforcement
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