foir_3880
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foir_3880
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FOI-R--<strong>3880</strong>--SE<br />
capabilities of the Afghan forces remain highly controversial: according to the<br />
Pentagon, only one of 23 Afghan Army brigades was able to carry out a military<br />
operation independently without any backup from ISAF in 2012 (Bumiller,<br />
2012). Increasing numbers of ‘green-on-blue’ attacks are raising additional<br />
apprehensions about the reliability of local forces, which are to take the leading<br />
security role in the country after 2014.<br />
When highlighting the importance of regional cooperation in a post-war<br />
Afghanistan, one should avoid overemphasis on the potentials of Central Asian<br />
republics. Support from key outside powers will still be needed if the situation in<br />
Afghanistan worsens substantially.<br />
In this regard, a balanced approach is required. Accordingly, Uzbekistan is<br />
pursuing a collective solution for Afghanistan involving both regional and key<br />
non-regional powers.<br />
PROJECTING POST-2014 AFGHANISTAN<br />
Based on the present tendencies inside the country it is not too difficult to predict<br />
a deterioration of the domestic security environment in post-2014 Afghanistan.<br />
Since 2011 the frequent green-on-blue attacks, when coalition forces are attacked<br />
and killed by their Afghan counterparts, have become a major threat for<br />
international coalition forces. In 2012 these accounted for 15 per cent of coalition<br />
deaths, which is 2.5 times as much as in the previous year (Roggio and<br />
Lundquist, 2013). According to the same source, between 2008 and April 2013,<br />
the number of those attacks totalled 76, with 44 of them carried out last year.<br />
One quarter of insider attacks were reportedly due to Taliban infiltration<br />
(Shanker, 2012). In the light of the ongoing drawdown and the transfer of main<br />
security responsibilities to the local army and police, the growing number of<br />
subversive actions in the ranks of Afghan soldiers puts the prospects of their<br />
providing domestic security after 2014 without close international assistance into<br />
serious doubt.<br />
Moreover, the Afghan Army, which was supposed to take the over the lead in all<br />
combat operations in the country by mid-2013 (The White House, 2012), still<br />
lacks competence and strength sufficient for it to fight effectively against Taliban<br />
and other anti-government movements. For example, the Afghan Army’s low<br />
credibility was evident in April 2013 when Afghan forces were only able to<br />
overcome hard resistance from a Taliban stronghold after nearby US forces<br />
supported them with an air strike (Ahmed, 2013).<br />
Another major threat emanating from Afghanistan is opium cultivation. In 2012<br />
the total area under opium cultivation increased to 154,000 hectares (ha)<br />
compared to 131,000 ha in the previous year (UNODC, 2012). Over a year<br />
opium production fell to 3,700 tons from 5,800 tons (due to plant disease and bad<br />
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