foir_3880
foir_3880
foir_3880
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FOI-R--<strong>3880</strong>--SE<br />
PRIMARILY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, NOT POLITICAL<br />
The political appetite for further integration is more apparent in Russia, Belarus<br />
and Kazakhstan, in Kyrgyzstan (whose accession to the CU was announced in<br />
2011), and in Tajikistan (which will join the CU only after Kyrgyzstan since it<br />
lacks common borders with other CU members). Participating in further<br />
integration is also on the political agenda in Armenia and possibly even in<br />
Ukraine.<br />
Each country sees economic incentives to participate in the EEU. Belarus<br />
enjoyed some 10 billion USD energy subsidies from Russia in 2012, equalling<br />
some 16 per cent of Belarus’ gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore,<br />
between summer 2011 and spring 2013, the Ministry of Finance of Belarus<br />
received five of the six tranches of the Eurasian Economic Union Anti-Crisis<br />
Fund, totalling some 3 billion USD. Russia supplied the lion’s share of the fund’s<br />
resources (Timarov, 2013).<br />
The programme to create the EEU is ambitious not only in the economic but also<br />
in the political and security spheres. Meanwhile some of the planned measures<br />
may meet difficulties and others may not be implemented at all. It may seem<br />
paradoxical, but the integration processes may not limit but rather strengthen the<br />
power of the member states’ leaders. Integration will be welcome as long as it<br />
improves the positions of national elites. Measures transferring national political<br />
power to a supranational body are, however, likely to meet ulterior though still<br />
fierce resistance. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev for example<br />
made this clear when discussing the prospects of the EEU in the Kremlin on<br />
24 December 2013. In his view, the protection of the state borders, migration,<br />
defence and security systems, health, education, science, culture, and legal<br />
assistance in civil, criminal and administrative cases ‘are not relevant to<br />
economic integration and cannot be transferred to the format of an economic<br />
union’ (Netreba and Butrin, 2013).<br />
Some of the goals are therefore unlikely to be achieved (at least in the<br />
foreseeable future). One example is coordination of foreign policy. Whilst<br />
demonstrating compliance and unified will on many issues, each member<br />
country is likely to retain the right to act independently in foreign policy.<br />
Another example is a single currency. Member states would not risk losing the<br />
right to print their own national currency. Finally, despite the creation of some<br />
integrated units within the CSTO, the plans for unified armed forces appear<br />
unrealistic.<br />
But is the Eurasian Union a Great Russian neo-imperial project to re-establish<br />
Russia’s hegemony and revive the USSR Not really. Since the states of the<br />
former Soviet Union have reached such a level of independence and built such<br />
extensive relations with various world powers they will not allow Russia to<br />
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