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FOI-R--<strong>3880</strong>--SE<br />

PRIMARILY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, NOT POLITICAL<br />

The political appetite for further integration is more apparent in Russia, Belarus<br />

and Kazakhstan, in Kyrgyzstan (whose accession to the CU was announced in<br />

2011), and in Tajikistan (which will join the CU only after Kyrgyzstan since it<br />

lacks common borders with other CU members). Participating in further<br />

integration is also on the political agenda in Armenia and possibly even in<br />

Ukraine.<br />

Each country sees economic incentives to participate in the EEU. Belarus<br />

enjoyed some 10 billion USD energy subsidies from Russia in 2012, equalling<br />

some 16 per cent of Belarus’ gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore,<br />

between summer 2011 and spring 2013, the Ministry of Finance of Belarus<br />

received five of the six tranches of the Eurasian Economic Union Anti-Crisis<br />

Fund, totalling some 3 billion USD. Russia supplied the lion’s share of the fund’s<br />

resources (Timarov, 2013).<br />

The programme to create the EEU is ambitious not only in the economic but also<br />

in the political and security spheres. Meanwhile some of the planned measures<br />

may meet difficulties and others may not be implemented at all. It may seem<br />

paradoxical, but the integration processes may not limit but rather strengthen the<br />

power of the member states’ leaders. Integration will be welcome as long as it<br />

improves the positions of national elites. Measures transferring national political<br />

power to a supranational body are, however, likely to meet ulterior though still<br />

fierce resistance. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev for example<br />

made this clear when discussing the prospects of the EEU in the Kremlin on<br />

24 December 2013. In his view, the protection of the state borders, migration,<br />

defence and security systems, health, education, science, culture, and legal<br />

assistance in civil, criminal and administrative cases ‘are not relevant to<br />

economic integration and cannot be transferred to the format of an economic<br />

union’ (Netreba and Butrin, 2013).<br />

Some of the goals are therefore unlikely to be achieved (at least in the<br />

foreseeable future). One example is coordination of foreign policy. Whilst<br />

demonstrating compliance and unified will on many issues, each member<br />

country is likely to retain the right to act independently in foreign policy.<br />

Another example is a single currency. Member states would not risk losing the<br />

right to print their own national currency. Finally, despite the creation of some<br />

integrated units within the CSTO, the plans for unified armed forces appear<br />

unrealistic.<br />

But is the Eurasian Union a Great Russian neo-imperial project to re-establish<br />

Russia’s hegemony and revive the USSR Not really. Since the states of the<br />

former Soviet Union have reached such a level of independence and built such<br />

extensive relations with various world powers they will not allow Russia to<br />

97

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