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relationship with Afghanistan in the security field as well by considering
repairing and modernising Afghan military equipment and training Afghan
security forces in its military training institutions (Weitz, 2013). As for
Kyrgyzstan, its intergovernmental relations with Afghanistan have been the most
limited of all the five Central Asian states, but the country has been hosting the
crucial Manas transit centre on the basis of bilateral negotiations with the US and
has turned into an important Central Asian destination for Afghan students.
Kyrgyzstan has also been rhetorically concerned about the conditions of its
Kyrgyz ‘ethnic kin’ in Afghanistan’s Pamir region and has rather dramatically
expressed its concerns about the negative impact of the post-2014 situation on
Central Asia (Dzhuraev, 2013; Kazemi, 2012a; Kazemi, 2012b).
The Afghan government sees its relationship with the Kazakhstani government
as a model for other Central Asian states to follow, for several reasons. The
relationship is organised, is developing and is being reinforced through
intergovernmental channels. Kazakhstan gives economic support to the Afghan
government as part of the broader regional process centred on Afghanistan and
enjoys the support of key international actors, especially the US. The Afghan
government, however, needs to realise that Central Asia is really five different
countries (Kazakhstan is particularly distinct), and certainly not a homogeneous
region. As for Kyrgyzstan, the existing state-to-state relationship is generally
insignificant and it is unclear how it might develop now that Kyrgyzstan has
finally opened its diplomatic representation in Kabul.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has briefly discussed how interstate relations between mainly
northern Afghanistan and its immediate and non-immediate post-Soviet Central
Asian neighbours will evolve beyond 2014, given the transition in Afghanistan
and a probable impending decline in the Western-led international community’s
engagement in the region. It has tentatively argued that Central Asian
governments, particularly those of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, might increasingly
resort to adopting defensive behaviour rather than engage in regional cooperation
under, most importantly, the Afghanistan-focused ‘Heart of Asia’/Istanbul
Process. Furthermore, the relationship between the Afghan and Central Asian
governments is heterogeneous: Tajikistan will probably be most affected if there
is a significant spillover of Afghanistan’s conflict northwards; Uzbekistan might
over-respond to any possible Afghan spillover; Turkmenistan is the least
involved and the least worried; Kazakhstan is viewed by Afghanistan as a model
of regional cooperation; and Kyrgyzstan is the least significant country when it
comes to a direct state-to-state relationship with Afghanistan. Finally, one should
keep in mind whether and how any further drastic deterioration in Afghanistan’s
politico-security situation would affect Central Asia and, conversely, whether
and how any potential Central Asian turmoil would impact upon Afghanistan.
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