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Solid Radioactive Waste Strategy Report.pdf - UK EPR

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<strong>EPR</strong> <strong>UK</strong><br />

N° NESH-G/2008/en/0123<br />

REV. A PAGE 165 / 257<br />

10.3.1 Identification of Safety Features<br />

Prior to selection of a safety system the first step in the selection process will be to determine<br />

whether a hazard can be eliminated. If the hazard cannot be eliminated then further assessment<br />

shall determine if the hazard can be reduced, for example, by reduction of the hazardous<br />

inventory used in a process. If a hazard cannot be reduced then an isolation measure shall be<br />

incorporated where practicable to isolate the operator from the hazard for example by the use of<br />

remote operations. If ‘eliminate’, ‘reduce’ or ‘isolate’ are judged not to be practicable only then<br />

should a control measure or engineered safety measure be deployed.<br />

During the design of the waste and spent fuel management facilities we shall apply the following<br />

hierarchy of controls is applicable:<br />

a) Accident Prevention<br />

a. Passive safety measures that do not rely on control systems, active safety<br />

systems or human intervention;<br />

b. Automatically initiated active engineered safety measures;<br />

c. Active engineered safety measures that need to be manually brought into service<br />

in response to the fault;<br />

d. Procedural safety measures that act to prevent a fault from progressing.<br />

b) Consequence Reduction<br />

a. Safety measures that act to mitigate the consequence of a fault.<br />

From the list above it can be seen that the design will incorporate passive safety systems in<br />

preference to active systems. Reliance will be placed on procedural controls only if provision of<br />

an engineered system is not practicable. Therefore the emphasis will be placed on hazard<br />

avoidance and then control rather than mitigation of an event once it has occurred.<br />

10.3.2 Generic Hazards from Operations of the <strong>Waste</strong> and Spent Fuel Management<br />

Buildings<br />

In the paragraphs that follow, the generic hazards that relate to the waste and spent fuel<br />

management buildings are described, together with a description of the safety features that may<br />

be used to control or mitigate the hazard. Details of safety features peculiar to a particular<br />

waste management facility or spent fuel facility are outlined later with the description of that<br />

facility.<br />

10.3.2.1 Direct radiation<br />

<strong>Radioactive</strong> waste (in particular ILW) and spent fuel emit penetrating gamma rays and neutrons.<br />

Employees and members of the public must be protected from exposure.<br />

Doses from direct radiation can be minimised by reducing exposure time, increasing distance<br />

from the radiation source and provision of shielding. In reducing exposure time and increasing<br />

distance from the source there is a preference for provision of engineered controls and design<br />

features where reasonably practicable. Remote operations may be implemented where<br />

appropriate to remove the operators from the radiation source. Both fixed and mobile shielding<br />

may be provided. In practice dose reduction will be achieved by a combination of the above<br />

measures.

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