Revolution in the Arab World - Observation of a lost soul Blog

foreign policy • revolution in the arab world • winners, losers
much more radical, long-lasting revolutionary process develop In other
words, will things look more like 1688 or 1789 Anxieties focus not on a
resurgent Nasserism, of course, but rather on the Muslim Brotherhood and
the possibility that Egypt may experience its own Islamic revolution, with
unpredictable consequences, not only for the country itself but for the region
and the world.
Against these anxieties, many commentators have been pointing to the
lack of ingredients, at present, for such a turn of events. Cairo in 2011, they
insist, is not Tehran in 1979. They argue that the crowds protesting Mubarak
called above all for democracy and expressed little enthusiasm for an Islamic
Republic. They characterize the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its long
and radical history, as a relatively ineffective organization that has recently
moved in more moderate directions and that lacks a charismatic leader like
Ayatollah Khomeini. In short, they are effectively arguing, the signs point
to 1688, not to 1789.
This analysis may well be accurate. But the history of revolutions suggests
that even if it is, the long-term outlook in Egypt is still a highly unstable one.
This is not only because events are hard to predict once they start moving
at revolutionary velocity, but because revolutions of the 1789 type do not
always start out as such. Hardly anyone at the start of the French Revolution
could have predicted the demise of the French monarchy and the Reign
of Terror. There were no Jacobins present at the fall of the Bastille in 1789,
only future Jacobins. France’s turn to radicalism took place after the Bastille
had been taken, within the revolutionary process itself—between 1789
and 1793. Similarly, Russia’s February Revolution of 1917 initially looked to
most observers like 1688: a short, sharp crisis that led to the fall of a monarch,
and the quick foundation of a constitutional regime. While Bolsheviks
were already present, few observers foresaw the October Revolution that
would bring Lenin to power.
Egypt probably does not face the prospect of an Islamic Revolution in
the next few months. But if Mubarak is replaced by a weak, unstable series
of governments that cannot restore order or deliver serious social and economic
reforms—and thus quickly lose credibility and legitimacy among the
population—then a different, far more radical revolutionary movement may
yet develop. And despite the current lack of a charismatic leader for such a
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