Revolution in the Arab World - Observation of a lost soul Blog

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foreign policy • revolution in the arab world • rumblings ment” with the Soviets, the Arab nationalism, and war with Israel. Change came again in October 1981 with Sadat’s assassination. Mubarak split the difference between his two predecessors—hanging onto Sadat’s economic liberalization or infitah, moving Cairo back toward the Arab mainstream (while not repudiating Sadat’s separate peace with Israel), and keeping Washington at arm’s length while continuing to secure its largesse. Beyond the big issues of Egypt’s foreign policy and ideological orientation, there have been less noticed social and socioeconomic changes in Egypt. When Mubarak took the oath of office on Oct. 14, 1981, the Egyptian population was 45.5 million, or slightly more than half of what it is today. Egypt’s gross domestic product was approximately $40 billion; it now tops $145 billion. There were only 430,000 telephone lines in the entire country; now there are approximately 11 million. The life expectancy of the average Egyptian was 57 years; it is now 70. The World Bank reports that in 1981 the literacy rate was less than 50 percent; now 66 percent of Egyptians can read. By a host of measures, life in Egypt has changed radically and for the better over the course of the three decades. Yet in the category of “if everything seems so good, why do I feel so bad,” even with all the important socioeconomic changes that have occurred, the country’s trajectory nevertheless seems flat. Indeed, in the abstract, Egypt today looks much like the country the Free Officers took over 58 years ago—poor, dependent on a global power, and authoritarian. The central problem is the nature of Egypt’s political institutions. Nasser and his associates developed a set of political institutions—rules, regulations, and laws—in response to the internal political challenges they confronted consolidating their power in the months following the July 1952 coup. These rules, regulations, and laws were inherently anti-democratic, rigged to serve the interests of the officers along with their civilian allies, and they formed the basis for subsequent institutional development. Those who benefited from this political order—the armed forces, regime intellectuals, bureaucracy, internal security services, and big business—have become a powerful constituency for autocracy. As long as the collective welfare of these groups remains connected to the regime, the kind of institutional change necessary for a more open and democratic political system is unlikely. That’s why the National Democratic Party’s “New Thinking and 24
foreign policy • revolution in the arab world • rumblings Priorities” was never intended to do anything other than institutionalize the power of the ruling party under the guise of political change. Reform conflicts with the worldview and material interests of Egypt’s leaders and their constituents. It is not just the formal institutions of the state, however, but a whole series of unwritten rules that shape the way Egyptians calculate what is in their best interests. To be sure, this is hardly unique to Egyptian society, but it nevertheless provides some insight into change and Egypt’s apparent resistance to it. There is a curious tendency for some reform-minded young professionals to throw their lot in with the regime, despite a professed desire for a fundamental transformation of Egyptian politics and society. Protestations abound about the desire to effect change from working within the state apparatus, but the reality is that the Egyptian regime manifests a powerful system of reward and punishment that encourages a measure of political conformity for those not willing to take their risks with Egypt’s vaunted internal security services. The inevitable question, “What can we do about this” is the sine qua non of all Washington policy discussions. The answer is: precious little. Institutional change is rare because it is hard and almost always associated with some sort of dramatic disequilibrium—defeat in war, revolution, or economic collapse. Yet, there are some things that outsiders can do, particularly in the context of Egypt’s looming succession, so that when Hosni Mubarak does take his last sail up the Nile, Washington has made it clear that it is on the side of transparency, free and fair elections, and nonviolence. Still, these kinds of declarations of principle are more about demonstrating good faith than they are likely to influence the thinking of Egypt’s new leader—who will be seeking to consolidate his hold on power and thus dependent on the very groups that have the strongest interest in maintaining the status quo. Steven A. Cook is the Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 25
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