Revolution in the Arab World - Observation of a lost soul Blog

foreign policy • revolution in the arab world • rumblings
ment” with the Soviets, the Arab nationalism, and war with Israel. Change
came again in October 1981 with Sadat’s assassination. Mubarak split the
difference between his two predecessors—hanging onto Sadat’s economic
liberalization or infitah, moving Cairo back toward the Arab mainstream
(while not repudiating Sadat’s separate peace with Israel), and keeping
Washington at arm’s length while continuing to secure its largesse. Beyond
the big issues of Egypt’s foreign policy and ideological orientation, there
have been less noticed social and socioeconomic changes in Egypt. When
Mubarak took the oath of office on Oct. 14, 1981, the Egyptian population
was 45.5 million, or slightly more than half of what it is today. Egypt’s gross
domestic product was approximately $40 billion; it now tops $145 billion.
There were only 430,000 telephone lines in the entire country; now there are
approximately 11 million. The life expectancy of the average Egyptian was
57 years; it is now 70. The World Bank reports that in 1981 the literacy rate
was less than 50 percent; now 66 percent of Egyptians can read. By a host
of measures, life in Egypt has changed radically and for the better over the
course of the three decades.
Yet in the category of “if everything seems so good, why do I feel so bad,”
even with all the important socioeconomic changes that have occurred,
the country’s trajectory nevertheless seems flat. Indeed, in the abstract,
Egypt today looks much like the country the Free Officers took over 58
years ago—poor, dependent on a global power, and authoritarian. The central
problem is the nature of Egypt’s political institutions. Nasser and his
associates developed a set of political institutions—rules, regulations, and
laws—in response to the internal political challenges they confronted consolidating
their power in the months following the July 1952 coup. These
rules, regulations, and laws were inherently anti-democratic, rigged to serve
the interests of the officers along with their civilian allies, and they formed
the basis for subsequent institutional development.
Those who benefited from this political order—the armed forces, regime
intellectuals, bureaucracy, internal security services, and big business—have
become a powerful constituency for autocracy. As long as the collective welfare
of these groups remains connected to the regime, the kind of institutional
change necessary for a more open and democratic political system
is unlikely. That’s why the National Democratic Party’s “New Thinking and
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