Warning Analysis for the Information Age - Higgins Counterterrorism ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

This need for analysis and building a conceptual “map” reflects the insights ofCol John R. Boyd, USAF, whose thoughts on warfighting are changing the waywe operate. Col Boyd is most famous for his collected briefings, A Discourse onWinning and Losing, in which he presents and develops the “observation-orientation-decision-actioncycle.” 9//■ Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at afaster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, better yet, get inside theadversary’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop.■ Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) therebygenerate confusion and disorder among our adversaries—since our adversarieswill be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacingas well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competingagainst. 10//Col Boyd recognizes that operations (Decide and Act) are important but alsoemphasizes the need for intelligence (Observe and Orient). I suggest thatMs.Grabo’s “warning analysis” and Col Boyd’s “orientation” are merely differentways of addressing the need for strategic warning by building conceptual “maps”or models. Accordingly, I will also draw heavily on Col Boyd’s exposition of theDecision Cycle or OODA Cycle in indicating a path ahead.... it has been deemed prudent and desirable to have indications orwarning specialists who, hopefully, will not be burdened or distractedby the competing demands placed on current analysts and will be ableto focus their attention solely on potential indications and their analysisin depth.It is imperative to the process that the facts, including potential or possiblefacts, and other indications be most diligently and meticulously compiledand analyzed. It is impossible to overemphasize the importance ofexhaustive research for warning. It is in the history of every great warningcrisis that the post-mortems have turned up numerous relevant facts9 Col John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, Collection of un-numbered briefingslides, August 1987. Cited hereafter as Col Boyd.10 Col Boyd. Boyd used briefing slides in which what was presented (or left out) and the positionof the text on the slide is as important as the text content. Therefore, whenever a whole slide of ColBoyd’s is used, it will be indicated by “// Slide //.”12
or pieces of information which were available but which, for one reasonor another, were not considered in making assessments at the time. 11A current intelligence analyst is a news reporter. A warning analyst is muchmore like a historian or scientist. When a reporter finds a story on a complex orhighly technical issue, he or she finds a historian or scientist to provide context.The intelligence community needs dedicated warning analysts to provide thatcontext.How can the great machinery of U.S. intelligence, which is capable ofspectacular collection and analysis on many subjects, fail to carry out thenecessary research in a warning situation? ...there are two obvious difficultieswhich arise and which may impede the research effort and the surfacingof the relevant facts...The intelligence research system is set up primarily to analyze certaintypes of information known as intelligence “disciplines” and on whichthere is a more or less continuing flow of material... In a crisis situation,great volumes of new material may suddenly be poured into the system.In order to cope, agencies often set up special task forces, and analystswork overtime in an attempt to cover every aspect of the problem...When it is most needed, communication may break down for sheer lack oftime.Even more insidious may be the less obvious impending crisis, where theinterrelationship of developments is not readily apparent, and particularlywhere two or more geographic areas may be involved. In such cases, thedifficulties of conducting research are greatly compounded when itemsfrom two different areas, particularly if they seem relatively obscure orquestionable at the time, may not be brought together at all.The greatest single justification for the existence of separate indicationsoffices or the employment of warning analysts is that they are devotingtheir full time to research in depth without the distraction of having tofulfill a number of other duties. The warning analyst should never losesight of the fact that this is his raison d’etre. It is difficult enough to cometo a sound warning judgment when all the facts have been considered; itmay be impossible without it. 1211 Grabo, 7, 9.12 Grabo, 10-11, 12.13
Page 1 and 2: Joint Military Intelligence College
Page 3 and 4: The Joint Military Intelligence Col
Page 5 and 6: CONTENTSAcknowledgements. . . . . .
Page 7 and 8: appreciate other distinctive elemen
Page 9 and 10: In addition to his promoting the in
Page 11 and 12: ADDITIONAL COMMENTARIES:Warning Ana
Page 13 and 14: “butter now” to build a strong
Page 15 and 16: orist groups half-a-world away mean
Page 17 and 18: intelligence and requires exhaustiv
Page 19 and 20: Chapter 2FROM CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Page 21: decades before the conflict when a
Page 25 and 26: probably been given too little atte
Page 27 and 28: warfare the army that could bring t
Page 29 and 30: Chapter 4PARADIGM SHIFTS — WHEN T
Page 31 and 32: NorthDakotaMoscowNow on the map bel
Page 33 and 34: line proponent is likely to say,
Page 35 and 36: In the Industrial Age we based our
Page 37 and 38: Let me explain by comparing the New
Page 39 and 40: ight now we have a position (potent
Page 41 and 42: The take-home message here is that
Page 43 and 44: degrees and one I took six minutes
Page 45 and 46: MESSAGE■ Suppress tendency to bui
Page 47 and 48: Example: I see a large mammal with
Page 49 and 50: In WMD analysis, these distinctions
Page 51 and 52: Chapter 6TOWARD NOVEL INTELLIGENCE
Page 53 and 54: Example 1 — An 8th Grade Science
Page 55 and 56: Information Retrieval is Built on L
Page 57 and 58: to extract all the entities or a me
Page 59 and 60: That means that unless own ship man
Page 61 and 62: Chapter 7FROM CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Page 63: analysis. A bigger database full of
Page 66 and 67: viduals subordinate their decisionm
Page 68 and 69: environment. In a world of limited
Page 70 and 71: account for any deviations from equ
Page 72 and 73:
In summary:■ When the world will
Page 74 and 75:
progress of that plan. If change is
Page 76 and 77:
have been reached. “If they do A,
Page 78 and 79:
Chapter 8MODELING THE DECISION CYCL
Page 80 and 81:
Efforts to date to use information
Page 82 and 83:
Assumptions—From Industrial-Age T
Page 84 and 85:
From Thinking Tactically to Thinkin
Page 86 and 87:
of enemy forces and that he prepare
Page 88 and 89:
Modeling Ourselves—How Can We Reo
Page 90 and 91:
Chapter 9MODELING THE TARGETHow do
Page 92 and 93:
systems is that they are organized
Page 94 and 95:
ing “power” plotted vertically
Page 96 and 97:
Biological systems extract energy a
Page 98 and 99:
NationalCommandAuthorityD ecision E
Page 100 and 101:
❏ Identifying and tracking the fi
Page 102 and 103:
There are two basic kinds of method
Page 104 and 105:
The two kinds of models are complem
Page 106 and 107:
Nation A$$Nation BMAPWhere?How?Targ
Page 108 and 109:
ORGANIZATION CHARTWho?Why?TARGET NA
Page 110 and 111:
Med.line (med’lin) vt. -lined, -l
Page 112 and 113:
Tracking a BW or Dual-Use Biotechno
Page 114 and 115:
The redundancy of the detailed kind
Page 116 and 117:
This followsStage of Weapon Life Cy
Page 118 and 119:
■ Ceremonial occasions can be ver
Page 120 and 121:
Massive Data?” However, the Case
Page 122 and 123:
When the first pass at the known en
Page 124 and 125:
Multidimensional Analysis for Strat
Page 126 and 127:
at an appropriate place in the time
Page 128 and 129:
When Col Boyd formulated the Decisi
Page 130 and 131:
problem, warning involves an in-dep
Page 132 and 133:
■ Observe the incoming reporting.
Page 134 and 135:
In the past—through the Industria
Page 136 and 137:
FROM HYPOTHESIS TO ASSESSMENTUsing
Page 138 and 139:
evidence. n. ... 5. Grounds for bel
Page 140 and 141:
suggested guidance and models of Ma
Page 142 and 143:
Using Homology Searching in Intelli
Page 144 and 145:
ways can be identified in this way
Page 146 and 147:
❏ Human intervention needed to ve
Page 148 and 149:
Input = (1) Analyst Input of METATE
Page 150 and 151:
Chapter 11MODELING OURSELVESHow can
Page 152 and 153:
When young children play soccer, th
Page 154 and 155:
To make matters worse, even the col
Page 156 and 157:
VERY NICEBut, simply stated, what d
Page 158 and 159:
From Software-Driven Tools Usage to
Page 160 and 161:
The Physical WorldSense 1O O D AThe
Page 162 and 163:
messenger to and from the edges of
Page 164 and 165:
The organization of the IC in this
Page 166 and 167:
Chapter 12GETTING THERE FROM HEREWe
Page 168 and 169:
From...Bigger Faster Technology,Fig
Page 170 and 171:
Chapter 13TOWARD AN INFORMATION-AGE
Page 172 and 173:
Robert Fulton sailed the steamshipC
Page 174 and 175:
tion, and it followed that they wer
Page 176 and 177:
drawn from a generation that thinks
Page 178 and 179:
mal or cultural population in terms
Page 180 and 181:
■ The IC needs to hire enough IT
Page 182 and 183:
By learning the lessons of Cynthia
Page 184 and 185:
INDEX3x5 card deck 51,134,137,142,1
Page 186 and 187:
Heisenberg, Werner 21, 111Heisenber
Page 188 and 189:
OODA Cycle 12, 38, 167Actor 62,102a
Page 190 and 191:
WMD 14-15, 81CBRNE 81, 114dual use
Page 192 and 193:
Other Books from the Joint Military
show all

Warning Analysis for the Information Age - Higgins Counterterrorism ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?