Warning Analysis for the Information Age - Higgins Counterterrorism ...

progress of that plan. If change is small and predictable, the organization needs tomake a plan with contingencies and look for indicators of that change to decidewhich contingencies to implement. Tactical warning is needed to provide thoseindicators. BUT...If change is constant and too great to account for all possible contingencies ina single plan, no matter how complex the plan is, the organization must be able tobuild a new plan even while it is executing the old. That is what strategic warningis all about.Current U.S. military and IC organizations were built to fight Industrial-Agewars. In the Industrial Age only current intelligence and tactical warning wererequired because strategic warning could be done by the decisionmakers themselveswithout any additional help from the IC:■ The Japanese bombing Pearl Harbor signaled a beginning of hostilities.FDR could come up with a strategic plan immediately to reallocateU.S. resources from butter to guns.■ The launching of Sputnik signaled the beginning of a new era. Eisenhowerand the nation could immediately come up with a new strategicplan to reallocate U.S. resources from just butter to guns plus butter —and a standing “strategic” force to be on call for instant reaction to anySoviet attack. But once the new strategic plan was in place and all thecontingencies of the plan fleshed out, the U.S. only needed tacticalwarning thereafter to assess and provide guidance at the decisionpointsin the plan.But 9/11 changed all that. In a world where multiple players are buildingWMD and terrorists can attack anywhere at any time, how do we build a plan tocounter WMD and terrorism? That requires strategic warning, and it appears thatstrategic warning is impossible in a constantly changing multi-player world.Therefore, we must begin to do the impossible... Build an IC organization thatcan provide strategic warning in a world of WMD and terrorism.From the Industrial Age to the Information Age–A New Balancebetween Intelligence and OperationsThe Decision Cycle is curious in that it is advantageous to remain in the intelligencehalf (Observe and Orient) for as long as possible but implement the operationshalf (Decide and Act) as quickly as possible. Building a plan is best donewith the maximum amount of information possible, so when an organization is inthe intelligence half of an OODA Cycle it tends to stay there as long as possible.68