community are formulated <strong>in</strong> the Afghan Compact of <strong>2006</strong>. Most of thesegoals were not achieved, due to their be<strong>in</strong>g too ambitious and due to theadverse and complex circumstances. The <strong>Netherlands</strong> was faced with this atthe local level <strong>in</strong> Uruzgan as well and this places the achievements <strong>in</strong>perspective.In addition to the deployment <strong>in</strong> Uruzgan, the Dutch <strong>participation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>ISAF</strong>also led to results outside Uruzgan. Dutch staff personnel made valuablecontributions to the <strong>ISAF</strong> staffs at various levels, which <strong>in</strong>cluded provid<strong>in</strong>gthe Deputy Commander (Air) of <strong>ISAF</strong>, the Deputy Chief of Staff Stabilityand twice provid<strong>in</strong>g the commander of RC-S. The <strong>Netherlands</strong> thus had astrong <strong>in</strong>fluence on <strong>ISAF</strong>’s operat<strong>in</strong>g methods and the progress of theoperation <strong>in</strong> those periods. In addition, the deployment of the ATF’s fighteraircraft and combat helicopters throughout Afghanistan frequently madedecisive contributions to the successful conclusion of confrontationsbetween <strong>ISAF</strong> units and <strong>in</strong>surgents.The <strong>in</strong>volvement of the embassy and political advisers at the national leveland outside Uruzgan expanded the network for Uruzgan considerably, aswell as <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to the dynamics of the region and <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g newactors.In its response to advisory report no. 64 34 of the Advisory Council onInternational Affairs, the government agreed that <strong>in</strong> the conduct of crisismanagement operations, for <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, ‘cooperation andcohesion’ and ‘modesty and level-headedness’ are guid<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples.Echo<strong>in</strong>g the advisory report of the Advisory Council on International Affairs,the government underl<strong>in</strong>ed that crisis-management operations <strong>in</strong>Afghanistan and elsewhere required a realistic attitude with regard to theextent to which the operations would be able to achieve their objectives <strong>in</strong>full. Formulat<strong>in</strong>g a realistic ambition with measurable, specific objectives isa derivative of that pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.6.2.3 Sub-conclusion: SecurityObjectiveThe objective <strong>in</strong> the area of security was that, <strong>in</strong> accordance with the <strong>ISAF</strong>mandate, the <strong>Netherlands</strong> detachment would focus on promot<strong>in</strong>g stabilityand security by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g support for the Afghan authorities among thelocal population and by weaken<strong>in</strong>g support for the Taliban and relatedgroups. In 2007, this objective was expanded to <strong>in</strong>clude the <strong>in</strong>tensificationof the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and coach<strong>in</strong>g of the Afghan security organisations.PolicyIn Afghanistan, <strong>ISAF</strong> applied a counter<strong>in</strong>surgency doctr<strong>in</strong>e which focused onobta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g support from the population. The <strong>Netherlands</strong> implemented thisdoctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> Uruzgan by mak<strong>in</strong>g use of the ‘<strong>in</strong>k blot’ strategy. This strategymeant that, given the available capacity of the Afghan authorities, the<strong>Netherlands</strong> and the Allies, the military efforts of the TFU were mostlyfocused on the ma<strong>in</strong> population centres <strong>in</strong> Uruzgan (Tar<strong>in</strong> Kowt, Deh Rawodand Chora), aim<strong>in</strong>g to guarantee more security for the Afghan people andenable further development. The build-up of the Afghan army and policewas an important precondition for the stabilisation of the prov<strong>in</strong>ce.Implementation34 Crisis-management operations <strong>in</strong> fragile states – the necessity of a comprehensive approach, Advisory Council onInternational Affairs, March 2009.Page 100 of 133
At the end of 2005, the Afghan authorities had little to no <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong>considerable parts of the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The security situation was poor and the<strong>in</strong>surgents had extensive freedom of action. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the mission, the<strong>Netherlands</strong> succeeded <strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g greater security for the populationcentres and thus for the majority of the people of Uruzgan. There was greatfear among the population that the <strong>in</strong>surgents would return. The protectionwhich the <strong>Netherlands</strong> was able to provide to the civilian population was attimes temporary and localised, depend<strong>in</strong>g on the situation. Not always werethere sufficient numbers of (Dutch) <strong>ISAF</strong> troops or ANSF personnel availablefor that protection to be permanent.In the first years of the <strong>in</strong>k blot strategy, operations at the high end of thespectrum of force were necessary on a regular basis. Confrontationsbetween the <strong>in</strong>surgents and <strong>ISAF</strong> troops led to casualties among our ownunits and among the local population. The comb<strong>in</strong>ation of, on the one hand,the high level of force and, on the other, operations <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g social patrolsand outreach activities by mission teams demanded a high level of flexibilityfrom the personnel. The units proved to be very capable of carry<strong>in</strong>g outthese activities, even if they were conducted close together <strong>in</strong> terms of timeand space. This had a positive impact on the effectiveness of theoperations. The freedom of movement of the PRT and the civilian expertsand diplomats was limited by the security situation. With<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>k blot, too,the PRT sometimes required force protection from the Battle Group, butthat protection was not always available. At times this hampered theactivities of the PRT. The activities of the American, Australian and Dutchspecial forces outside the <strong>in</strong>k blot were essential <strong>in</strong> reliev<strong>in</strong>g the pressureon the <strong>in</strong>k blot.ResultsOw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> part to Dutch efforts, the presence of the Afghan army <strong>in</strong>creased<strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Uruzgan. In <strong>2006</strong>, the Afghan army’s presence <strong>in</strong> theprov<strong>in</strong>ce was very limited and the police apparatus was weak. From 2007,more attention was focused on build<strong>in</strong>g up a properly function<strong>in</strong>g policeapparatus. In <strong>2010</strong>, the effective size of the 4 th brigade <strong>in</strong> Uruzgan wasapproximately 3,200 personnel. In the period up to <strong>2010</strong>, the <strong>Netherlands</strong>tra<strong>in</strong>ed around 1,000 police officers.With the gradual expansion of the <strong>in</strong>k blots, an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of thepopulation were brought under the protection of <strong>ISAF</strong> and the Afghanauthorities, despite the pressure from and <strong>in</strong>fluence of the <strong>in</strong>surgents.The Dutch <strong>in</strong>k blot strategy was based on the premise that after a certa<strong>in</strong>period of time, the Afghan security services would be able to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>security <strong>in</strong> the relatively safe areas largely without assistance. That wouldfree up capacity to expand the <strong>in</strong>k blot further. The <strong>in</strong>dependence of theANSF envisaged <strong>in</strong> the Article 100 letter, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the transfer ofresponsibility of security <strong>in</strong> the populated areas, was not achieved dur<strong>in</strong>gthe mission, however. This laid extra claims on the Dutch <strong>ISAF</strong> units.The <strong>in</strong>k blot areas were expanded over a period of four years. In <strong>2010</strong>, thearea controlled by <strong>ISAF</strong> and the Afghan army and police <strong>in</strong>cluded more thanhalf of the population of the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Economic activity <strong>in</strong>creased andNGOs found their way to the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. The improved security situation is,however, fragile and not irreversible.6.2.4 Sub-conclusion: Good governanceObjectivePage 101 of 133
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Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
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High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
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Table of ContentsDutch military per
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Dutch military personnel deceased i
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1 IntroductionThe government would,
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The structure of the final evaluati
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2 The international presence in Afg
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insurgents in, particularly, the ea
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3 Netherlands policy for participat
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Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
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“The objectives of this stabilisa
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In December 2005, the Netherlands g
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The expectation is that meaningful
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3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
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4 Implementation of the mission and
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tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
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such as the Bushmaster, that was be
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Afghan partner unit, at all times o
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northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
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in large and small bases, while con
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previously thought and comprised a
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Apart from facilitating training an
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If operations in close proximity of
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- Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
- Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
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- Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
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- Page 123 and 124: EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
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- Page 129 and 130: July: microcredit provider World Co
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