Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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which was in line with the lessons learned during the posting of a PRT toBaghlan in 2004 - 2006. 6The 3D approach of the Dutch did not come about in isolation. It showssimilarities with NATO’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. 7Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a type of deployment in conflicts where theaim is to diminish the influence of insurgents and to protect the civilianpopulation. Fighting insurgents is not the exclusive domain of military units,but also involves political efforts and the use of development resources; it istherefore a 3D operation by definition. It is essential, however, that allelements act in a coordinated fashion following the same agenda.Critical success factors in COIN are: 8• The primacy of a political rather than a military solution to theconflict.• Separation of the insurgents from the population so that theinsurgents are isolated from their logistic base.• Providing protection to the civilian population.• Use of a minimum of force.• Civil-military cooperation involving civil governance, police andmilitary personnel.• Availability of adequate and timely intelligence.• Strategic patience, i.e. accepting that lasting results will onlybecome visible after an extended period of time. This requires along-term investment in resources and presence.Along with security, building good governance and structural socioeconomicdevelopment played an equally important role in the Netherlands’policy, which was not always the case in the ISAF interpretation of the COINdoctrine.The government stated the following in the Article 100 letter of 2005:“In the south and the north of Afghanistan, it will take many more yearsbefore the Afghan government will be independently capable of ensuringsecurity and stability. It is therefore not realistic to expect that after twoyears, security, stability and positive economic development will be able toprevail in Uruzgan without outside assistance.”“It is possible, however, for the Netherlands to make a substantialcontribution to creating a situation in Uruzgan in which the Afghanauthorities will have expanded their influence and authority in the provinceand are increasingly capable of ensuring security and stabilityindependently. The Netherlands will do this by contributing to improving thesecurity situation and improving governance.Improving the effectiveness of the Afghan security organisations, i.e. theAfghan National Army (ANA) and the police, forms part of this.As the security situation improves and stability increases, the economy willalso have the opportunity to develop. In addition, the Netherlands canactively provide an impulse to reconstruction and to improving the livingconditions of the population. Immediately following the deployment, CIMICactivities will be initiated, aimed at strengthening popular support for the6 Parliamentary Document, 29 521, No. 407 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) – AJP-3.4.48 Dr T.W. Brocades-Zaalberg: “’Hearts & Minds’ or ‘Search & Destroy’”, Militaire Spectator 7/8-2007Page 20 of 133
Netherlands’ presence. Furthermore, work on reconstruction projects willbegin as soon as possible following the deployment.”“The government emphasises, however, that striking results will requiresome time to be achieved and will not be visible right from the start. Thegovernment expects, however, that there will be visible results towards theend of the intended deployment period of two years.”“In the longer term, the Afghan government in Uruzgan, as in the rest ofAfghanistan, will be better capable of providing the basic needs of thepopulation, offering the prospect of a better future and preventing thecountry from again becoming a safe haven for international terroristnetworks.”The policy framework of the Netherlands’ efforts in the areas of goodgovernance and socio-economic development in Uruzgan, as described inthe Article 100 letter of 2005, was set out more concretely in theAfghanistan Compact and the civil assessment (see box below).Civil assessment of the province of UruzganTo gain a better understanding of the social and civil situation in theprovince, in the summer of 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, incollaboration with the Netherlands Embassy in Kabul, the DefenceIntelligence and Security Service (DISS) and the Australian Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade/AUSAID, developed a so-called civil assessment,on the basis of extensive consultations and with the help of the Afghanorganisation The Liaison Office (TLO). This assessment was partly based onthe Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), theAfghanistan Compact and the national sectoral programmes. The I-ANDSfunctioned as a provisional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) andcontained, among other things, objectives to be achieved at the provinciallevel. The I-ANDS formulated an overall strategy that was founded on threepillars, namely: (1) security, (2) good governance, rule of law and humanrights and (3) socio-economic development.The assessment attempted to identify and analyse the various dynamics insociety and governance and how they affect the region and the population.The assessment revealed that Uruzgan was one of the poorest and mostconservative provinces of Afghanistan. It was also established that formalgovernment structures in the province were non-existent or weak.Government organisations were able to perform their tasks in a very limitedpart of the province only. The governance that did exist suffered from alack of legitimacy, so that the population traditionally harboured a distrustof government institutions and had low expectations of them. The civilservice apparatus was very weak in manpower in Uruzgan. In addition,most officials were illiterate and did not possess sufficient knowledge toperform their tasks adequately. Informal power structures exerted a greatdeal of influence in the province.Ethnic, tribal, economic, criminal and power-political factors were veryimportant at the local level, so that there was no effective local governmentin place. There were many conflicts in Uruzgan that were defined alongtribal lines. The Popolzai tribe was over-represented in governmentpositions. Other tribes hardly had any share in power and influence. Theprovincial governor at the time, Jan Mohammad Khan, favoured his ownPopolzai tribe and frequently used force in his dealings with other tribalgroups. The Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National ArmyPage 21 of 133
Page 1 and 2: Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4: High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8: Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10: Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12: 1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14: The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 23 and 24: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72:
Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74:
The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76:
purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78:
In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80:
5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82:
Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84:
expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86:
Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88:
explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90:
this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92:
organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94:
occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96:
Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98:
6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100:
The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102:
At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104:
province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106:
area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108:
ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110:
d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112:
Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114:
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116:
end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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