Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

If operations in close proximity of each other had been planned, then solidagreements regarding deconfliction were required in advance. Support wasonly given to OEF units in emergency (in-extremis) situations. This appliedto both TFU and ATF, with the latter also being deployed for tasks outsideUruzgan. For military operations, it is an undesirable situation for twooperations to take place simultaneously under different mandates and withseparate command structures within the same geographical area. Thiswould not conform to the principles of unity of command and unity of effort.Military operations could only be carried out if sufficient exchange ofinformation had taken place between the two missions. Apache and F-16pilots did not always know in advance whether units requesting air supportwere operating under ISAF or OEF mandate. At times, this resulted in timeconsumingverification procedures to make sure that Dutch conditions hadbeen met before (air) support could be given. However, this did not occur inthe case of requests of (air) support during emergency situations, such asurgent self-defence. In one case, air support was given to Afghan troops,who, as later emerged, were operating under the OEF mandate. As far ascan be ascertained, the Dutch actions taken on behalf of OEF did not lead tocivilian casualties. Only on a small number of occasions did the contingentcommander, in his capacity as red-card holder, veto provision of airsupport.The fact that the Netherlands was the lead nation in Uruzgan did not resultin actual unity of command over all coalition partner units present in theprovince. That was only the case for foreign units under direct command ofthe TFU, of which the Australian M(R)TF was the largest. The noncompulsorycharacter of coordination with other parties, particularly specialforces, was an obstruction to unity of command.4.3.8.5 CounterterrorismThe TFU did not focus on so-called counterterrorism operations, but on theink blot strategy. The ink blot strategy fits in with the general endeavour toprevent Afghanistan from becoming a stronghold for terrorist networks.4.3.9 Civilian casualtiesFor the Netherlands, the prevention of civilian casualties is, within thecontext of international law and international humanitarian law, of greatimportance with regard to the deployment of the armed forces duringarmed conflicts. During the deployment in Afghanistan, the prevention ofcivilian casualties was not only a goal in itself, but also contributed toachieving the objectives of ISAF (‘to protect the people’ being among them)and to the acceptance of ISAF among the local people. After a number ofincidents in which Afghan civilians became unintended casualties of ISAFactivities, the prevention of civilian casualties and collateral damagebecame increasingly important in the planning and execution of ISAFoperations throughout Afghanistan. If, despite the measures taken,indications arose pointing to civilian casualties, the ISAF would investigatethe matter. Other organisations (the UN and various NGOs, but also themedia) also investigated such incidents. In the period that the Netherlandswas active in Uruzgan, successive ISAF commanders introducedincreasingly meticulous procedures, focusing on the prevention of civiliancasualties and collateral damage, into their Tactical Directives. Particularlythe deployment of air support was subject to ever more careful proceduresand this also applied to the deployment of Dutch fighter aircraft and attackhelicopters. This process resulted in a substantial reduction in numbers ofcivilian casualties during ISAF operations. The more stringent guidelinesPage 47 of 133