Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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One of the objectives of the Netherlands was to promote good governance.In the judgement of the government, success in this mission was possible ifthe Afghan government and provincial administration gained legitimacy,human rights played a greater role, corruption was dealt with moreeffectively, democracy gained more room to manoeuvre and the peacedividend became visible for the population.PolicyCapacity-building, promoting transparency and integrity in governance andimproving representativeness were the three main pillars of the policyaimed at improving local administration. In addition, increasing theinvolvement in the province of Uruzgan of the national government in Kabulwas a policy priority.ImplementationDutch policy was undermined by a lack of Afghan political will at the highestlevel to bring about an effective administration. Representatives of the localadministration in Uruzgan received little practical support from Kabul and atthe national level, too, the political will to deal with corruption, nepotismand incompetence was often lacking. In addition, there was no tradition of acentral government authority, due to the long-standing tribal society ofAfghanistan.ResultsSome promising first steps were taken in the field of good governance andthese produced some modest results. A fundamental improvement of theeffectiveness of the formal local administration will take longer than theduration of the mission, however.Despite various Dutch initiatives, capacity-building in the area ofgovernance in Uruzgan was laborious. Many positions in the administrationof Uruzgan were either not filled or only after a considerable length of time.There was, however, a modest improvement in the staffing levels within theUruzgan administration, namely from 20% to 30%. The ruling (tribal) eliteand the drug trade profited from the status quo. The perception of thepopulation regarding the integrity of the administration has shown littleimprovement. The results in the area of good governance within the formalprovincial and district authorities fell short of the initial ambitions andexpectations as set out in the Article 100 letters.The effects of the Dutch efforts aimed at restoring tribal dialogue andcooperation show a more positive picture. Diplomacy and social outreach tokey individuals in Uruzgan and elsewhere were of great importance in thisrespect. The Dutch approach was aimed at having all tribes participateactively in the development of the province. This emphasis on tribal balanceand inclusiveness in local government marked a definite shift in the balanceof power within the province. The Dutch policy of not working formally withinformal leaders with bad reputations helped gain the trust of marginalisedtribes. It did not, however, lead to curbing the power and influence of theseinformal power brokers; even without a formal power base and withoutcontact with the Dutch military, they continued to play a significant roleduring the course of the mission.The Dutch efforts have led to an increase in attention, both in Afghanistanand internationally, for the province. The administrative distance betweenthe province and Kabul has been reduced. With diplomatic efforts, theNetherlands succeeded in bringing (international) funds and the roll-out ofAfghan national government programmes from Kabul to this disadvantagedPage 102 of 133
province. This, too, was done by means of quiet diplomacy and socialoutreach to key individuals in Uruzgan and elsewhere. This is a positiveresult.There was constant attention during the mission for the way in whichsupport could be given to the Afghan authorities in the area of counterdrugsactivities. The policy of the mission in this area was mainly aimed atproviding a long-term alternative to local farmers who often opted forpoppy cultivation on economic grounds. The achievements in this respecttherefore lie in providing an alternative source of income rather thaninterdiction and eradication. The introduction of new crops such as saffronand the planting of fruit trees have strongly improved crop diversity in theprovince and have provided alternatives to poppy cultivation.6.2.5 Sub-conclusion: Socio-economic developmentObjectiveThe objective for socio-economic development was to promotereconstruction as an important component of a strategy aimed at stabilityand peace-building.PolicyThe reconstruction eventually focused mainly on five sectors: health care,education, justice, agriculture and infrastructure. The common theme was“linking up with Afghan national programmes”, and striving to "encourageand if possible facilitate reconstruction activities by (Dutch) NGOs”.ImplementationThe projects and programmes were developed on the basis of a conflictanalysis in which the local dynamics and causes of instability wereidentified. The activities were therefore focused on the districts of theprovince of Uruzgan and on tribal, ethnic and religious groups. In particularthe population groups which felt marginalised, by the authorities and theruling elite, needed to be reached. Most of the larger projects focused onthe three large population centres in the districts of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawodand Chora.The short duration of the tours of the TFU and the PRT led to great pressureto produce concrete results within a period of four or six months. Thisresulted in many small initiatives which contributed to the visibility of theDutch presence and acceptance of the military presence. Jobs were alsocreated for the duration of these activities. These small-scale, quick andvisible activities, aimed at specific village communities, were just a firststep towards sustainable development activities. These projects were thenfollowed up by long-term development projects as soon as was possible.Bringing in national programmes and actors with experience in the areas ofeducation, health care and rural development gave an initial impulse forsustainable, long-term development. This build-up from short, quick andvisible projects to long-term, sustainable development was of greatimportance. The local authorities could thus increase their presence andlegitimacy in the province.The mission began with a limited number of sectors for socio-economicdevelopment, but gradually it became clear that the Afghan authorities, theNGOs and other donors were hardly active at all in the province and thatbroader efforts would be required for the cohesion between the variousissues. In order to achieve results, the Netherlands had to be active in moresectors than had been foreseen. In addition, the Netherlands made efforts,Page 103 of 133
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Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
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High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
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Table of ContentsDutch military per
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Dutch military personnel deceased i
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1 IntroductionThe government would,
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The structure of the final evaluati
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2 The international presence in Afg
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insurgents in, particularly, the ea
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3 Netherlands policy for participat
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Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
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“The objectives of this stabilisa
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In December 2005, the Netherlands g
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The expectation is that meaningful
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3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
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4 Implementation of the mission and
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tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
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such as the Bushmaster, that was be
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Afghan partner unit, at all times o
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northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
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in large and small bases, while con
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previously thought and comprised a
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Apart from facilitating training an
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If operations in close proximity of
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As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76: purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78: In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80: 5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82: Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84: expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86: Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88: explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90: this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92: organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94: occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96: Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98: 6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100: The first part of the central quest
Page 101: At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 105 and 106: area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108: ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110: d. The recommendations from advisor
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Page 113 and 114: Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116: end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118: Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120: Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122: Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124: EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126: Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128: Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130: July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132: Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133: Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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