Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

More documents

Recommendations

Info

As from the end of 2006, the Dutch embassy concluded a number ofcontracts with the aim of getting national programmes operating inUruzgan. These programmes related to education, health care and ruraldevelopment. Further on in this chapter they will be explained further in thedescription of the Dutch efforts at a sectoral level. In order to enable theimplementation of national programmes, the Netherlands has on severaloccasions facilitated visits of Afghan ministers to the province of Uruzgan.The Netherlands also repeatedly brought up this question during bilateraltalks in Kabul.The flow of national funds down to the local level proved to be difficult,especially in the case of EQUIP. The causes were the lack of good (air)connections with the province and the lack of a banking system, so thatfunds had to be transported physically. The provincial and nationalauthorities, with the support of the embassy, lobbied national banks toopen branch offices in Uruzgan. On account of a shortage of capacity at theAfghan Ministry of Finance and the lack of an institutional framework, theintroduction of "programme based budgeting” for the national budget,which had been stimulated by the World Bank and its donors, sufferedsevere delays. Despite the pressure exerted by donors on this and otherministries, the problem persisted for a long time.The aim of working as far as possible via the government also had itsdrawbacks. Administrative problems had a major impact on the progress ofthe reconstruction: weak formal government structures hampered theidentification and implementation of projects. As a result of the securitysituation, there were only few implementing organisations and littlesupervision by the World Bank at a provincial level. Certain elite groups andpowerbrokers, moreover, were pursuing their own interests when it came toprojects being carried out or not, especially where pieces of land or thehiring of personnel were concerned. In addition, formal key figures, both onthe side of the donors and the Afghans, did not always remain in their postsfor long.Sub-conclusion on national programmesThanks to intensive lobbying, the Netherlands managed to get Kabul to paymore attention to a disadvantaged province such as Uruzgan than to otherprovinces. This enabled a number of national programmes to be launched inthe province. The slow flow of funds and the undercapacity at a provinciallevel, together with insufficient supervision by the World Bank, continued tohave a negative impact on the implementation.4.5.5 Civil domainIn line with the integrated character of the Dutch deployment, the mottohas always been ‘as civilian as possible, as military as necessary’. The focuswas primarily on the people, with the idea that more prosperity would givepeople the much-needed prospect of a better future. This could eliminatethe feeding ground for anti-government elements and increase support forthe Afghan authorities, thus leading to stability. In view of the pre-definedduration of the Dutch mission and in the interest of continuity in theconstruction process, lasting beyond the departure of the Dutch mission,the Netherlands tried to create as much scope as possible for Afghan civilpartners and multi-year programmes.4.5.5.1 Civil organisationsUruzgan was one of the least secure regions in Afghanistan and even theAfghan national statistical office was unable to gather relevant data on thisprovince. This was not only due to the actual dangers present there, butPage 66 of 133
also the way in which Afghans perceive the province. Uruzgan is seen asthe province from which the foremost Taliban leaders originated. Theinhabitants of the province were considered to be extremely conservative.The consequence of this unfavourable image was that few Afghans wantedto work there. As a result, there was little enthusiasm for civil organisationsto carry out programmes or open local branches in Uruzgan. The Dutchapproach in Uruzgan and particularly the fact that Afghan organisationswere treated as equal partners and were able to operate in relative peaceattracted progressively more organisations to the province.Although there were relatively few NGOs in the province at the end of 2007,this number gradually increased, thanks to the ongoing efforts of theNetherlands in this direction. The government signed a contract with theMicrofinance Investment Support Facility Afghanistan (MISFA) to set up alocal branch of an NGO that founded financial institutions for microcreditassociations. The FAO was the first UN organisation that was ready tooperate in Uruzgan, in cooperation with local NGOs. In addition, theGerman development organisation GTZ and the DCU were granted asubsidy for multi-sector programmes. It took some time before theseactivities led to visible and, in most cases, lasting results.The province of Uruzgan was not only dangerous, but was still quiteinaccessible and difficult to reach. As from mid-2009, therefore, theNetherlands subsidised a civilian airline for the purpose of providing flightsto the province. In addition, it invested in the construction of a civilianterminal at Tarin Kowt Airport.4.5.5.2 Donor coordination at a provincial levelLack of capacity and the security situation in parts of the province were themain obstacles to development. In Afghanistan as a whole and also inUruzgan there was a need for strong Afghan leadership and UN donorcoordination. Thanks to the Dutch efforts, the number of civil organisationsgrew; at the end of 2008 there were over twenty, including local, nationaland international organisations. More and more Afghan-run developmentcooperationprojects were set up, taking over from CIMIC and QVPs. Therewere over fifty local and international organisations and programmesoperational in 2010. The capacity of these organisations varied. Good donorcoordination was needed on a provincial level. That is why the Netherlandssupported the strengthening of Afghan coordination in this area and lobbiedUNAMA to set up a UN office in the province. The DCU also played animportant role in the coordination of the NGOs in Uruzgan. Enlargement ofthe civic terrain meant not only an expansion of the civilian staff of the US,Australia and the Netherlands in Uruzgan, but also that the Afghangovernment, the UN and NGOs would take over, step by step, thestabilisation and reconstruction tasks of the PRT. The PRT fulfilled animportant role by helping the provincial government to coordinate thevarious activities, including the involvement and stimulation of theProvincial Development Council. The Netherlands encouraged theestablishment of various consultative structures. Much time and energy wasdevoted to developing the relationship with our Afghan counterparts. Thedevelopment advisers conducted intensive consultation with the provincialministries and were also closely involved in coordination at a district level.Consultation with the local population was crucial in order to prioritise andmanage the OS programme. This created mutual understanding andpromoted stability.For the purpose of coordination, information exchange and joint deploymentin the agricultural sector, a Technical Working Group on Agriculture andPage 67 of 133
Page 1 and 2:
Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4:
High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6:
Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8:
Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10:
Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12:
1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14:
The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19 and 20: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 21 and 22: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 23 and 24: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65: development programmes. Before the
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76: purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78: In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80: 5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82: Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84: expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86: Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88: explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90: this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92: organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94: occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96: Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98: 6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100: The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102: At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104: province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106: area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108: ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110: d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112: Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114: Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116: end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
show all

Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?