Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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Operations around the Baluchi ValleyIn the 2006–2010 period, various large-scale, initially solely militaryoperations took place with the objective of bringing the Baluchi Valley,which connects Tarin Kowt with Chora, under control of ISAF and theAfghan government.In 2006, after the arrival of the DTF, but before the TFU had becomeoperational, the coalition troops conducted the large-scale Operation Perthwith the intention of eliminating the threat emanating from the valleyoccupied by insurgents, a relatively short distance from Kamp Holland,which was under construction at the time. Task Force Viper played a role inthe preparation and execution of this major operation. The operation was asuccess, but within months of the coalition troops’ departure, the valleyonce again became unsafe.At the end of 2007, another large-scale operation was conducted, undercommand of the TFU. The Dutch Battle Group, with the assistance of theRC-S reserve battalion, carried out another operation to clear the BaluchiValley of insurgents. After the operation, posts were set up in the vicinity ofthe northern and southern entrances to the valley in order to prevent thevalley falling back into Taliban hands. The operation was successful, but,without the permanent presence of the ANSF or ISAF, after just a fewmonths the Baluchi Valley once again became unsafe.Late in 2008, an integrated 3D operation was conducted under command ofthe TFU to once again clear the Baluchi Valley of insurgents. The operationwas a more integrated affair than the two previous operations. In the firstphase, contact was made with the tribal leaders to inform them of the TFU’sintentions and to assess their own wishes and ideas. Directly after theoperation, reconstruction activities were carried out and, on the basis of theearlier experiences, the decision was made to maintain a permanent ANSFand ISAF presence in the valley. In contrast to previous years, there weresufficient numbers of ANSF troops available to carry out that task. TheBaluchi Valley remained reasonably stable.At the end of 2010, the Baluchi Valley is still reasonably stable. A pavedroad from Tarin Kowt to Chora, an important reconstruction projectfinanced by the Netherlands, is being built through the Baluchi Valley. Thefirst 16 kilometres of the road had been completed by June 2010 and led toaccelerated socio-economic development of the areas in the vicinity of theroad.The size of the ink blot (or ADZ) was limited owing to, among other things,the number of troops available from both the TFU and the Afghanauthorities. The initial intention was for the Afghan police force to ensuresecurity inside the ink blot, whereas ISAF and the Afghan army were toenforce security at the periphery of the zone. However, in the first fewyears this proved unfeasible owing to an insufficient number of Afghansecurity units becoming available for provision of security within the inkblot. This restricted the possibility of ISAF and the Afghan army expandingthe area of the ink blot. The limited availability of supporting enablers was afurther restriction on TFU operations.During the course of 2007, the ink blot was expanded to the district ofChora, which was heavily fought over by ISAF and insurgents. But therewere also (temporary) relapses in the expansion of the ink blot when theinsurgency managed to regain its influence in certain areas, such as in thePage 38 of 133
northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007. By the end of 2007, the ink blotencompassed the areas around Tarin Kowt, central parts of the Choradistrict and the southern part of Deh Rawod. The northern part of DehRawod was added to the ink blot in the spring of 2008. Various majoroperations were conducted in the Baluchi Valley and the area connectingTarin Kowt and the Chora Valley. The area was not stabilised until late2008, after an integrated approach to operations had been taken. In 2009and 2010, the ink blot was extended further in the direction of Deh Rashanand Mirabad; the areas around Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod were alsoexpanded.ADZ and ink blot 2007Page 39 of 133
Page 1 and 2: Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4: High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8: Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10: Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12: 1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14: The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19 and 20: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 21 and 22: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 23 and 24: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76: purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78: In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80: 5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82: Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84: expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86: Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88: explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90:
this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92:
organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94:
occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96:
Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98:
6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100:
The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102:
At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104:
province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106:
area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108:
ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110:
d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112:
Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114:
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116:
end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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