Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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The ISAF leadership included a US subordinate commander who, along withhis function in ISAF, was in command of the deployment of OEF units. AfterNATO had taken over command of ISAF and its area of operations wasexpanding across Afghanistan, it became essential to coordinate anddeconflict OEF’s and ISAF’s activities. Particularly the security of theparticipating units was important. The OEF units did not fall under thecommand of NATO, but nonetheless operated within ISAF’s area ofresponsibility. From 2001, the Netherlands made several contributions toOEF in Afghanistan, for different periods of time and with variouscompositions, participating with special units, transport helicopters, F-16fighter aircraft, a tanker aircraft, a transport aircraft, a maritime patrolaircraft, and liaison officers at various locations. 52.4 Netherlands and ISAFThe Netherlands has been involved in ISAF from the start. Initially, thisinvolvement consisted of an infantry company and support, a CommandoCorps platoon, contributions to international staffs, the deployment of an F-16 unit and financial contributions. In 2003, the staff of the German-Netherlands Corps formed the core of the ISAF headquarters in Kabul. In2004 and 2005, the Netherlands supplied an Apache detachment. From2004 through 2006, the Netherlands supplied a PRT in the province ofBaghlan in the north of Afghanistan. In 2005, the Netherlands provided anElection Support Force for the elections that were held in September of thatyear, and from the same year it supplied an F-16 detachment, supported bya KDC-10 tanker and transport aircraft. From 2006, as ISAF deployed tosouthern Afghanistan, the Netherlands took up command of ISAFoperations in the province of Uruzgan. Uruzgan came under the area ofresponsibility of ISAF’s Regional Command South (RC-S), along with theprovinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Daykundi and Zabul. The otherlead nations in the south were Canada, the United States and the UnitedKingdom. Prior to and during the mission, consultations with these partnersabout what approach should be taken in RC-S were held at administrativeand ministerial levels.5 Parliamentary Document 27925 No 28 of 6 December 2001, and following.Page 18 of 133
3 Netherlands policy for participation in ISAF 2006 -2010In December 2005, the Netherlands government decided in favour ofmaking a substantial contribution to ISAF. The government informed theHouse of Representatives of this decision pursuant to Article 100 of theConstitution in its letter to Parliament of 22 December 2005. Thegovernment decided in late 2007 that the Netherlands’ responsibility inassisting the Afghan authorities in Uruzgan would be extended by a periodof two years, until 1 August 2010. The House of Representatives wasinformed of this decision in the Article 100 letter of 30 November 2007.These letters define the grounds for the Netherlands’ deployment inUruzgan.As stated in the letter of 30 November 2007, the Netherlands was to end itsleading military responsibility in Uruzgan as per 1 August 2010. The debateabout possible deployment after 1 August 2010 led to the fall of thegovernment in February 2010. The withdrawal of the Dutch militarypersonnel and the transfer of responsibilities in Uruzgan began on 1 August2010.3.1 The Netherlands’ policyThe Article 100 letter of 2005 contained the following passage:“In accordance with the ISAF mandate, the Netherlands detachment willfocus on promoting stability and security by increasing support for theAfghan authorities among the local population and by weakening supportfor the Taliban and related groups.Promoting good governance, an efficient police and army and the rule oflaw, performing CIMIC and reconstruction activities, and promotingreconstruction activities by others are important elements of this approach.In view of the security situation, it is necessary to ensure that the PRT andits personnel are well protected. In certain areas it may also be necessaryto conduct offensive actions in order to enable the PRT and the Afghangovernment to be active in those areas.”It was agreed with Australia that the Netherlands would be lead nation inUruzgan and that the two countries would form a combined task forceunder Dutch leadership.The Netherlands’ policy was founded on the 3D approach, although it wasnot explicitly designated as such in the Article 100 letter of 2005. The 3Dapproach is sometimes also referred to as the comprehensive or whole-ofgovernmentapproach. For the comprehensive approach to work, it wascrucial that the political, military and development goals were reconcilableand complementary.In the 3D approach, military, diplomatic and development efforts areconnected as much as possible and integrated where possible and desirableto achieve the final goal. The underlying thought is that security, goodgovernance and development are inextricably linked. The complex problemsin Afghanistan could not be addressed by one single ministry. Efforts in thethree main areas (the three Ds) therefore had to be tuned in to one anotherand had to strengthen one another where possible. The Article 100 letter of2005 stated that activities in the areas of all three Ds would be undertaken,Page 19 of 133
Page 1 and 2: Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4: High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8: Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10: Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12: 1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14: The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 21 and 22: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 23 and 24: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70:
tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72:
Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74:
The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76:
purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78:
In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80:
5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82:
Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84:
expenditure related to the deployme
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Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
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explosive ordnance disposal, armour
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this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92:
organised at a later stage. In addi
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occupational social workers and the
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Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
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6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
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The first part of the central quest
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At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104:
province. This, too, was done by me
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area, increased sales of agricultur
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ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110:
d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112:
Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114:
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116:
end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
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EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
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July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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