Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

Afghan partner unit, at all times only after explicit permission from the NLDCHOD. These operations stood in direct relation to the activities and missionof the TFU in Uruzgan.TF-55 was supported in each mission by so-called enablers, such ashelicopters, engineers, fire support (mortars), Explosive Ordnance Disposal(EOD) units and capabilities for electronic warfare (EW). TF-55 did not haveits own enablers. The unit consequently had to rely on the TFU and RC-S forenabler capabilities.4.3.6 The ink blot strategy in practiceBefore the handover to ISAF in 2006, OEF coalition troops in Uruzgan hadfour bases, two near the population centres in the south of the province, atTarin Kowt and Deh Rawod, and two at a more northerly location in theprovince. The Article 100 letter of 2005 contained the following passage:“In view of the size of the units made available for the mission, the taskforce will, for the time being, not occupy all four of the current baseslocated in Uruzgan. The Dutch area of deployment will remain restricted tothe southern part of the province of Uruzgan”.Initially, the ADZ in Uruzgan encompassed solely the population centres ofDeh Rawod and Tarin Kowt. In order for the ink blot to expand, smallerposts (Forward Operating Bases and Patrol Bases) were established in theperiphery of the ink blot.Consequently, in a large area of Uruzgan there was no Dutch militarypresence. In the districts of Chahar Chineh and Khas Uruzgan, Americanspecial forces were active, while Australian special forces were operating incentral Uruzgan.Activities related to socio-economic development were not restricted to theADZ. Disadvantaged tribes, who often supported the Taliban, also had theirsettlements outside the ADZ. They were actively approached in order toimprove their socio-economic situation by means of development projects,thus reducing their support for the Taliban. In this context, among theactivities carried out were the building of bridges and renovation of waterchannels in the Gizab district.The ISAF strategy of the four separate operational phases (Shape, Clear,Hold and Build), described earlier, was not carried out strictly according tothe concept. In practice, a strict separation between the separate phases(both in time and space) was not possible to achieve. At certain times,different parts of Uruzgan were in different phases of the concept. Whereasthe Shape phase was initially solely focused on aspects of the militaryoperation, activities carried out in this phase became, more than waspreviously the case, focused on the needs of the local people, bringing thisphase more in line with the following phases. The same can be said for theother phases. Eventually, operations were prepared (Shape) in such a waythat after the operation (Clear) had taken place, security could beguaranteed (Hold) and reconstruction projects could be started (Build). Theintegration of these different elements became more pronounced as themission progressed, which benefited the effectiveness of specificoperations. The necessity of repeat operations in the Baluchi Valleyhighlighted the importance of an integrated approach.Page 37 of 133