Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

eplace him. The appointment of Munib’s successor, Governor Hamdam,was also in line with Dutch policy. These two governors had no direct ties toUruzgan province and could therefore start their duties with a relativelyclean slate. They were also able to bring disadvantaged tribes back intopolitics. At the beginning of their periods of office, the two men were able toachieve, in relative terms, quite a lot; it is therefore in those periods thatthe most progress was made regarding good governance.However, in both cases, the effectiveness of the two governors diminishedduring the course of their terms of office. An active first period in the termsof both Munib and Hamdam was followed by a period with little activity andless progress. This was partly due to the influence that informal leaders,such as Jan Mohammed Khan, were able to exert. Informal leaders oftendid not support the policies of Munib and Hamdam and regularly workedagainst local government initiatives. This was a negative influence on thedevelopment of good governance. In Governor Munib’s case, he was notonly thwarted in his efforts by informal leaders in Uruzgan but also lost theconfidence of the population, further weakening his position. Anotherconsequence of the negative influence of informal leaders was the gradualdecline in the governors’ enthusiasm for making greater efforts for theprovince, resulting in them appearing less and less in the province itself.The complex government position and the influence of informal leaders onthe government’s endeavours greatly influenced the effectiveness of theprovincial government.Tackling corruption was an important part of enhancing the transparencyand integrity of local government. The Netherlands combated corruption byonly entering into agreements with reliable partners and by implementingnational programmes with national control mechanisms. At the same time,these partner organisations had a monopoly position, particularly at thebeginning, owing to the limited number of actors. There was increasingcorruption due to the availability of large sums of donor funds. Therefore, acritical attitude was adopted and a critical dialogue opened regarding theefforts of these organisations. Cooperation was ended if an organisationwas not functioning appropriately and transparently.The Netherlands also made efforts at the international level in asking formore attention for tackling corruption. One example of this is that theNetherlands, in the context of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund(ARTF), continuously requested the World Bank’s attention for theintroduction of a system of local responsibility for expenditure of financialresources; and, subsequently, for the World Bank to monitor the system.This would act as a control mechanism for better detection of corruption.However, at the end of the mission, it can be concluded that corruption isstill a major problem and is an obstruction to the effectiveness ofgovernment.Sub-conclusion on transparency and integrityThe perception of the population regarding the integrity of the provincialand district government has shown little change for the better. The TLOperception study confirms as much. Confidence in local government hasremained at a low ebb and the population perceives local civil servants tobe corrupt, poorly qualified for their jobs and guilty of nepotism.4.4.3 Power brokersAs described above, the influence of informal leaders is a problem for theformal system. In practice, the question of doing business with these powerbrokers proved to be a complex issue. Before the arrival of Dutch militarypersonnel in Uruzgan, Jan Mohammed Khan was Governor of the province.Page 54 of 133