Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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3.3 Afghanistan CompactOn 31 January 2006, the Afghanistan Compact was adopted in London. Thisagreement established a mechanism for coordinating the Afghan andinternational assistance efforts for a five-year period. The AfghanistanCompact supports the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy of theAfghan government (I-ANDS), which sets out the vision and the investmentpriorities of the Afghan government. The I-ANDS is a reflection of thenational consultation process, which forms the basis for the benchmarkpoints in the Afghanistan Compact and the target figures of the MillenniumGoals for Development in Afghanistan. This I-ANDS functioned as atemporary Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and contained, amongother things, goals at the provincial level.The main objectives of the Compact were: improving the security situation,improving governance, and promoting social and economic development, ina comprehensive way and in collaboration with the Afghan government. Thecompact contained, among other things, benchmark points for goodgovernance and reconstruction, including capacity-building in governmentservices and civil society, the fight against corruption, and regionalcooperation. A summary of the Afghanistan Compact is included in Annex A.The objectives were defined in broad terms for the whole of Afghanistanand could therefore not be made to apply literally as specific objectives forthe province of Uruzgan.3.4 SecurityThis paragraph deals with a number of military aspects of the 2009 ReviewProtocol, after which the practical aspects of the ink blot strategy arediscussed.3.4.1 Security assessments and risksAt the end of 2005, the Afghan authorities had little to no influence in largeparts of Uruzgan, while the insurgents had extensive freedom of action. Theinsurgents in Uruzgan were characterised by their great diversity. They notonly consisted of Taliban, but also included ethnic groups with their ownsets of interests and criminal networks who protected their interests byforce. The Taliban itself comprised several different groups. The hard coreof Taliban fighters came mainly from outside the province and even fromabroad; helpers and sympathisers were often paid for taking up armsagainst the Afghan government and ISAF or did so for opportunisticreasons. In addition, local conflicts about matters such as land and waterwere a source of violence. As a result, there was a multitude of armedgroups operating in the region. They had in common their refusal to acceptthe presence of ISAF and their armed resistance against the Afghangovernment and ISAF. This multitude of opponents are collectively referredto as ‘insurgents’ in this evaluation.As the mission progressed, it was observed that the insurgents attachedgrowing importance to creating support among the population. They tried toactively muster this support by offering the population their own, traditionaltype of justice and a form of shadow governance. The insurgents kept aclose watch on corruption within the local government in Uruzgan and usedit as their principal instrument for retaining or increasing their supportamong the population. Furthermore, they made an increased effort to limitthe number of civilian casualties in their operations locally.Page 24 of 133
In December 2005, the Netherlands government decided to participate inISAF in Uruzgan province. The first Dutch troops arrived in the province inthe summer of 2006. The security situation had deteriorated in themeantime. 9 This was caused by a combination of actions by the insurgents,abuse of power by regional and local governments, tensions between tribesand clans, and various criminal activities. The insurgents carried out attackson patrols, logistic supply lines and bases of the coalition forces and theAfghan security organisations. It was also acknowledged that the localpopulation had been exposed to propaganda by the insurgents. There wasalso a great deal of intimidation taking place. It was clear that theinsurgents were able to move freely in parts of Uruzgan, where theyenjoyed much support among the local population. Initially, the coalitionforces and the Afghan government exerted only little influence in thoseareas. Therefore, the insurgents were able to use these areas as operatingbases for their attacks and actions. Incidentally, the main point of activitiesof the insurgents in southern Afghanistan was in the provinces of Helmandand Kandahar.From the beginning of the Dutch participation in ISAF, the governmentrecognised that there would be a real risk to Dutch personnel and thatcasualties among Dutch personnel were possible. It was assessed that theinsurgents would attack patrols, bases and logistic supply lines (by air andby road). In addition, it was clear that not only the insurgents, but alsodrug-related crime, corruption and tensions between ethnic groups andlocal conflicts were potential risk factors. Furthermore, there were certainrisks for the deployed personnel in relation to the timeliness of the medicalevacuation chain and with regard to infectious diseases.3.4.2 The ink blot approachThe Netherlands’ security policy in Uruzgan was based on the ink blotstrategy which was also part of NATO strategy. As part of this, the AfghanDevelopment Zones (ADZs), or ink blots, were created. These zonesconcentrated on the large population centres in Uruzgan (Tarin Kowt, DehRawod, Chora) and were to be gradually extended over time. Based on amilitary assessment and taking into account the financial and politicalparameters, the deployment of 1,200 Dutch military personnel to Uruzganwas initially foreseen.Whereas the Article 100 letter of 2005 referred to the contribution toimproving the security situation in general terms, the Article 100 letter of2007 stated the concrete objectives as: “helping the Afghan army and theAfghan police establish effective control over the main inhabited areas andconnecting roads”. It was also indicated that: “responsibility for security inthe inhabited areas of Uruzgan is expected (…) to be transferred graduallyto Afghan National Security Forces in the spring of 2010.”From the moment the mission began, Dutch policy focused attention onstrengthening the Afghan army and police. This aspect was intensified whenthe mission was extended. The Article 100 letter of 2007 contained thefollowing passage:“With regard to the ‘stabilisation and security’ line of operation (Defence),this approach means an even stronger focus on Security Sector Reform,which includes strengthening and training the Afghan National Army (ANA),the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Counter-Narcotics Police”, which iselaborated in more detail as:9 Parliamentary Document 27925 no. 213 of 18 April 2006 and Parliamentary Document 27925 no. 237 of 20October 2006.Page 25 of 133
Page 1 and 2: Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4: High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8: Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10: Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12: 1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14: The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19 and 20: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 21 and 22: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 23: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76:
purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78:
In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80:
5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82:
Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84:
expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86:
Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88:
explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90:
this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92:
organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94:
occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96:
Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98:
6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100:
The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102:
At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104:
province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106:
area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108:
ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110:
d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112:
Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114:
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116:
end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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