Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

civilian element of the Dutch contribution was only carried out by a limitednumber of personnel at several locations and in cooperation with variousparts. As a result, the image of the mission was not always balanced.Another factor behind the diplomats' work in the mission not receiving agreat deal of attention lies in the necessity to handle information regardingNGO projects which were active in Uruzgan and funded by the Netherlandswith a certain degree of discretion. NGOs did not want to be associated withISAF so as not to jeopardise their own safety and that of the localpopulation. Too obvious a connection with the military deployment wouldmake these projects, and the unarmed civilians working on them, intotargets for the insurgents.It can be concluded that the 3D approach was effective in this mission. Asconcerns future missions, each (post-) conflict situation will require its own,specific approach. It is important to assess during the orientation andplanning stages prior to any deployment whether contributions from variousministries are required. In addition to creating an interdepartmental missiondesign, interdepartmental mission reviews must also be held. The 3Dapproach is therefore not a goal in itself; the input from the variousministries and actors must have added value and be based on the localcontext of the mission area.6.2.7 Sub-conclusion: Aspects in the implementation of the missionThe implementation of the mission has taken a great toll on theorganisations involved. At the Ministry of Defence, the work-up process forthe deployment to Afghanistan had to compete with other priorities.Particularly for units which were deployed often, this put extra pressure onthe training and exercise programme. The decision to extend theparticipation in ISAF in 2007 placed an extra burden on some units. Inaddition, the deployment itself was felt to be intensive, particularly on thepart of the scarce categories of personnel who went on severaldeployments. The aftercare for the deployed personnel is therefore an issuewhich has received specific attention. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs hadlittle experience in conducting such a large-scale mission and had to makeconsiderable efforts to ensure its personnel were well prepared for theirdeployment to Uruzgan. For instance, it was not until mid-2008 that theteam from Foreign Affairs was able to conduct their preparation for thedeployment to Afghanistan in cooperation with their counterparts fromDefence.Many (international) partners (ISAF, OEF, UN, Afghan authorities, NGOs)were active, directly or indirectly, in Afghanistan. The Netherlands acted aslead nation, but had no formal powers. This situation required a great dealof ad hoc coordination by the Dutch staff. That coordination process was attimes difficult, and as a result maintaining the unity of effort and unity ofcommand in the mission took a considerable amount of energy.The mission further professionalised the armed forces, but was also aformidable challenge. For instance, the time available for deploying theDeployment Task Force at the beginning of the mission was very short,which resulted in logistic problems, particularly in materiel management,which was to have an influence on the mission for a long time. As themission progressed, extra efforts and assets also proved necessary. Forinstance, during the mission there was a shortage of what are referred to asenablers: counter-IED assets, medical personnel, intelligence-gathering andprocessing capacity, helicopter capacity and safety features of certain typesof vehicle. These shortcomings could largely be remedied during themission. In the implementation of the mission, the strict division betweenPage 106 of 133