Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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Afghan ministers visited the province. The objective of these visits was toopen a dialogue and to be personally informed of problems at local level.Two other initiatives in Uruzgan started at the same time as the IDLGprogramme. These were the Afghan Subnational Governance Programme(ASGP), in which the Independent Administrative Reform & Civil ServiceCommission (CSC) was involved, and the Priority Reform andReconstruction (PRR) programme. The objective of the two programmeswas to increase the number of qualified civil servants operating at theprovincial level. The Netherlands has urged the CSC to devote moreattention to the recruitment and training of civil servants in Afghanistan. Asa consequence, in early 2010, the CSC committed itself to strengtheningprovincial government in Uruzgan by providing more civil servants and,furthermore, fulfilled this pledge with Australian funding by establishing aprogramme for capacity-building in Uruzgan. Fifty trainees were recruitedfor the programme and trained for employment with the provincialgovernment. By the end of 2010, 37 of these trainees were employed inprovincial government.The activities of various NGOs and international organisations (IOs) inUruzgan also showed an increase. The ASGP and UNDP and the opening ofa UNAMA field office in the province are examples of this. The eventualestablishment of a UNAMA office in Uruzgan was a direct consequence ofDutch diplomatic efforts and resulted in the UN carrying out variousdevelopment programmes in Uruzgan (‘food for work’, school mealprogrammes and vaccination programmes). Prior to the mission, there wereonly seven NGOs active in Uruzgan; in 2010, the number of NGOs that wereor had been active in Uruzgan had increased to over forty. This increasewas partly the result of conscious Dutch efforts, on the diplomatic andsecurity fronts, to stimulate the civil domain in the province.Among these activities, there were also initiatives aimed at enhancing thecapacity and quality of local government. For example, the German NGOGesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) provided trainingcourses to government officials and The Asia Foundation (TAF) madeadvisers available to local governors with the aid of Dutch funding. Inaddition to TAF, the IDLG also employed a number of Afghan advisers insupport of the Governor of Uruzgan. During the course of the mission, theGovernor appointed 20 advisers, but in practical terms these did not allexercise an equal amount of influence. This was due to the fact that theGovernor as well as the advisers had little budgetary and discretionaryauthority. This authority was vested in the provincial ministries, whichoperated under directions from Kabul. For this reason, the Governor and hisadvisers could do relatively little about possibly dysfunctional ministries. Allin all, only a part of the advisers, particularly the advisers for security,infrastructure and rural development, had an influence on policy inUruzgan.Various training courses given on the subject of good governance haveresulted in more civil servants becoming aware of its basic principles. Theseprinciples include the administrative planning and budgetary cycle.At the national level, the Netherlands did not only request more focus onpoor governance in Uruzgan and on the funding of various programmesaimed at enhancing the effectiveness of local government, but also investedin improving government buildings and other civil service facilities. This wasa highly necessary step for developing governance. One example of thiswas the reopening of the White Compound, the seat of the districtPage 52 of 133
government of Chora in January 2010, made possible by the renovation ofthe building with Dutch resources. This project contributed to making thedistrict government better able to carry out its administrative work.The visibility of government in Uruzgan in 2010 has improved since 2006.After decades of absence, district governments were set up in two districts(Deh Rawod and Chora) following efforts made by the Netherlands. Thepopulation in these areas is once again involved in politics, after a longabsence of formal government. This is a step in the right direction.During the course of the mission, the Netherlands continuously advocated,both at the national and international levels (e.g. during variousinternational conferences on Afghanistan), a broad, national capacitybuildingprogramme. In June 2010, the Afghan government approved theSub-National Governance Policy Framework on the basis of agreementsmade during the London conference. This acted as the new Afghan nationalpolicy framework for the improvement of local government, with subframeworksfor financial management, capacity development and tacklingcorruption.Sub-conclusion on capacity-building:Despite all of the initiatives taken, capacity-building in the area ofgovernance was laborious. The figures show moderate progress in thequantitative capacity of formal local governance; from 20% to 30% interms of staffing, as the TLO report states. Although, by the end of themission, the positions of governor and chief-of-police were manned in alldistricts, a large proportion of the other positions remained vacant. Thismeans that by late 2010, capacity shortfalls were still among the biggestproblems for the development of good governance.4.4.2 Transparency and integrityIn addition to capacity-building, one of the policy priorities in place was toenhance the legitimacy of local government by improving transparency andintegrity. At the start of the mission, government organisations did nothave a great deal of legitimacy among the local population. Variousproblems, among them the dominance of the Popolzai tribe in localgovernment positions, played a part in this phenomenon. In addition,appointments were almost always based on personal relations with highplacedprovincial or national government officials or even the President,instead of on qualifications for the job. Large-scale corruption withinprovincial government and failure to apply financial control mechanismswere further problems in this area.The 2007 Article 100 letter announced the intensification of Dutch policyregarding the support and mentoring of local governance in Uruzgan.Increasing the transparency and integrity of local governance was meant toincrease the population’s confidence in local government organisations, inturn resulting in acceptance and greater effectiveness of theseorganisations. At national level, the Netherlands pressed for theappointment of government officials known for their personal integrity.In the context of transparency and integrity, the Netherlands alsoadvocated a policy of appointing suitable candidates for jobs. As part of theNetherlands’ efforts in this field, the Netherlands lobbied for provincial civilservants who did not belong to the Popolzai tribe and were of goodreputation. On a number of occasions, the Dutch lobby met with success.For example, Jan Mohammed Khan resigned before the Dutch missionbegan and a governor with a better reputation, Munib, was appointed toPage 53 of 133
Page 1 and 2: Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4: High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8: Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10: Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12: 1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14: The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19 and 20: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 21 and 22: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 23 and 24: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76: purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78: In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80: 5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82: Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84: expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86: Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88: explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90: this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92: organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94: occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96: Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98: 6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100: The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102: At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104:
province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106:
area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108:
ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110:
d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112:
Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114:
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116:
end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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