Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

conditions under which ASGs were hired were laid down in contracts withthe individual members and the commander of the Afghan securitycomplement. The ASGs had previously been hired in Uruzgan by the UnitedStates and the Netherlands continued this arrangement. The ASGs had agood reputation. The contracts with the Afghan Security Guards wereterminated in late 2010. The cost associated with hiring civilian serviceproviders is an integral part of the HGIS-Defence budget.5.3.4 Material and logistic support from the NetherlandsFollowing the government decision of 2005 and the ensuing parliamentarydebate, the Deployment Task Force (DTF) built two compounds in Uruzganto accommodate the Dutch contingent. The Netherlands had committeditself to taking over the role of lead nation in Uruzgan from 1 August 2006.When the final decision for the mission was taken, accompanied with theintention to start the deployment on 1 June 2006, there was little time leftto form the DTF, to prepare it for deployment, to make other necessarypreparations and to ensure that the compounds were ready in time for thearrival of the first main force. The outcome was that, by the time the firstrotation of ISAF arrived, the build-up of the facilities at Tarin Kowt and DehRawod was two months behind schedule. Containers with unclear contentslists, the slow pace of procurement of required materiel and difficulties withthe strategic transport of materiel contributed to this problem.For the mission in Afghanistan, use was initially made of the organic assetsof the deployed units. It soon became clear, however, that the ruggedterrain and high concentrations of particulates placed a heavy burden onthe materiel, causing it to wear at a faster rate than it would under normalcircumstances and requiring greater repair efforts. To prevent thisincreased wear and tear of materiel from affecting the deployability of thearmed forces, the Defence organisation was given extra financialmanoeuvring space, i.e. the so-called Van Geel and Bos funds, for a numberof years to make the necessary investments in materiel. The effects of wearand tear could thus be mitigated.The international logistic line to Afghanistan was long and vulnerable. Forthe transport of heavy equipment, use was made of commercial shippingbetween the Netherlands and the port of Karachi in Pakistan; the transportover land from the port of Karachi to Uruzgan was done by road.Replenishment of food, drinking water and fuel took place through NATO viathe same route. Due to the volatile situation in western Pakistan and alongthe part of the route running through Afghanistan, it was not alwayspossible to keep the buffer supplies at the desired levels in the missionarea, especially where drinking water and fuel were concerned. Urgentdeliveries of goods as well as personnel movements were conducted usingair transport. Along with the national military air transport fleet, hiredaircraft, including a helicopter, were also used to do this. Specialrequirements were set to aircraft conducting flights in Afghanistan. Inconnection with the security situation, aircraft needed to have certain selfprotectionassets, among other things. Partly for this reason, a Dutchtranshipment facility had been set up in the UAE. Transport from theNetherlands to the UAE was done with aircraft unsuitable for operation inAfghanistan, while for the journey from the UAE to Afghanistan tactical airtransport was employed. All Dutch air transport, of both personnel andmateriel, was routed to Afghanistan via the UAE.5.3.4.1 Fast Track ProcurementAs the mission progressed, the opponent made increasing use of IEDs. Thevehicles used by the Netherlands Defence organisation (particularly thePage 94 of 133