Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

As previously mentioned, the prevention of collateral damage wasconstantly an important point of focus during the deployment of air supportby the ATF. For example, use was made of the option involving the smallestamount of force in achieving the desired effect, i.e. by low fly-overs or bydropping flares without use of force. If possible, the lightest types ofammunition were selected for operations, with precision ammunition as thepreferred option. In the deployment of air weapons, the ground unitrequesting the support was responsible for target selection and targetdesignation. The pilot is responsible for deciding whether the use ofweapons is possible within the Rules of Engagement in force and with aminimum of collateral damage. Much attention was given to this pointduring the preparation of pilots and ground units. The same considerationswere made during the use of the TFU’s heavy weapons (mortar, selfpropelledhowitzer). Furthermore, the consideration of a minimum use offorce was also made at, for example, checkpoints in the case of warningshots being fired. Every incident involving the use of force by the TFU andthe ATF was reported to the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service viaTroops in Contact reports and After Action Review/Mission Reports. Theseincidents were then examined and, in some cases, led to a full investigationby the Public Prosecution Service. None of these cases led to prosecution.UNAMA and ISAF reports show that, unfortunately, suicide attacks and IEDattacks are increasingly affecting the local people. The Netherlands made anumber of ex gratia payments in the case of collateral damage.Sub-conclusions on securityIt is difficult to draw objective sub-conclusions regarding the developmentof the security situation in Uruzgan. Security incidents often have severalcauses. The number of security incidents give an indication of the securitysituation, but this is a rather rough criterion for drawing definitiveconclusions. Moreover, in assessing the security situation in Uruzgan,account should be taken of the fact that the Dutch presence in the area waslargely limited to inside the ink blots; foreign units were active outside theink blots. Claims made about the effect of the Dutch deployment in Uruzganon the security situation focus mainly on the areas within the ink blot.During the period that the Netherlands was in the province, the securitysituation inside the ink blot improved. Increased security made socioeconomicdevelopment possible. There was a sharp reduction in the numberof direct confrontations with the insurgents. Studies carried out by anumber of organisations, among them The Liaison Office (TLO) 18 and TheAsia Foundation 19 , indicate as much. Owing to the poor security situation inUruzgan during 2006 and 2007, the Asia Foundation was unable to carryout studies in the area; after 2007, however, it was able to continue itsresearch. Martine van Bijlert 20 from the independent Afghan AnalystsNetwork asserts that: “Attempts by the Dutch military and their civiliancounterparts to avoid exacerbating existing conflicts and to reach out todisaffected and marginalized leaders have helped regain a level of stabilityin areas such as Darafshan, Chora and Deh Rawod. The situation, however,remains highly fragile”. In March 2010, a petition was submitted to theDutch representative during a shura (meeting of tribal and village elders)which contained the following passage: “The economic and social progresswould not have been achieved without military protection of the18 “The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010 – A TLO socio-political assessment” (August 2010)19 The Asia Foundation, “Yearly survey of the Afghan people” (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).20 Martine van Bijlert: “The Battle for Afghanistan – Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan”, New AmericanFoundation, September 2010Page 49 of 133