Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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the deployment to Afghanistan. If it demonstrably led to more efficiency,and in consultation with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, incertain specific cases the decision was made to allow an exception to theHGIS rules by transferring funds from the HGIS part of the Defence budgetto the regular Defence budget. An example is keeping open the LogisticSupport Unit in Eygelshoven for repair work to materiel brought back fromAfghanistan.The toll taken by ISAF on the ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’budget was considerable. Supplementing the HGIS ‘Conduct of crisismanagementoperations’ budget was also required to accommodate thefour-year mission in Uruzgan. There was little scope for prioritisation withinpolicy article 20 instead of adding to the budget. Many of the missions thathad already been planned were related to international obligations. Thislarge-scale and long mission thus took a great toll on the HGIS 'Conduct ofcrisis-management operations' budget. On average, during the 2006-2010period, around 78% of the total budget was used for the militarycontribution to ISAF. The decision for the Netherlands to make an extensivecontribution to ISAF over a period of four years meant that there was littlefinancial room for other (crisis-management) operations.In addition to the expenditure funded by the HGIS, the mission in Uruzganalso gave rise to costs funded by the regular Defence budget. These costswere the result of changes in the concept of operations and the loss ofmateriel in combat and due to major wear and tear. The Defence budgetwas not sufficient to fund all the necessary expenditure, so funds wereadded to it. For instance, the Bos and Van Geel funds were added to allowinvestment in new materiel for the mission. Additions for operational lossesand for the purchase of the Bushmasters were also required.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has funded an amount of approximately EUR373 million from the HGIS for the Dutch participation in Uruzgan. Thesefunds made a considerable contribution to development cooperationactivities, specifically in Uruzgan and, more generally, in Afghanistan as awhole.6.3 LessonsThere are lessons to be drawn from the Dutch participation in ISAF. Somelessons are important for future missions, others relate mainly to thecontext in Uruzgan. Some lessons have already been applied, others are yetto be.6.3.1 General lessonsa. If ambitious goals are set, sufficient resources must be madeavailable to achieve those goals. Changing circumstances demand adegree of flexibility in the deployment of extra resources.b. Prior to a mission, specific result indicators should preferably beformulated (for instance for the development of security or of trustamong the population). These can then be used for monitoring andevaluation.c. For missions in fragile states, the transfer of responsibility to thelocal authorities should be one of the initial objectives.Page 108 of 133
d. The recommendations from advisory report no. 64 of the AdvisoryCouncil on International Affairs (including exchanges, training andexercises, exchanges of officials between the ministries of Defenceand Foreign Affairs) should be elaborated.e. Ensure that there is sufficient capacity so that diplomats and othercivilian experts are able to do their jobs under protection.f. Good mutual agreements are needed between the ministriesinvolved regarding media policy, public information and publicstatements, in order to support the public image of the mission andcreate support for the mission.6.3.2 Lessons to be consolidateda. The current (national and NATO) COIN doctrine requires adjustment,followed by permanent review.b. In a 3D approach, integral planning of activities and soundinstitutional embedding of responsibilities from the start of theplanning stage is recommended.c. A mission with an obvious civilian component should have sufficientcivilian expertise at its disposal, including interpreters. To that end,the pool of rapidly deployable civilian experts and the flexibledeployment of diplomats from the ministry of Foreign Affairs requireparticular attention.d. Prior to a (military) deployment it should be decided whether a civilassessment is required. The results of such an assessment should bemade available as early in the process as possible, in order for themto have the greatest possible impact. Preferably they should beavailable, therefore, during the preparation of the decision-makingprocess regarding the mission.e. Close cooperation with other lead nations in multinational missions isimportant. The relationship between and the division ofresponsibilities among the various actors present (NATO, UNAMA, EUand NGOs) require daily and intensive coordination.f. The required troop strength and deployment duration for theparticipation in a mission must allow flexible adjustment if thecircumstances change, for instance after mission reviews.g. The financial estimate for a mission must be realistic, on the basis ofthe parameters which are known at that time. In addition,unforeseen expenses must be explicitly taken into account. Changesin the parameters require a review of the estimate.Page 109 of 133
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Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
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High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
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Table of ContentsDutch military per
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Dutch military personnel deceased i
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Page 11 and 12:
1 IntroductionThe government would,
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The structure of the final evaluati
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2 The international presence in Afg
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insurgents in, particularly, the ea
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3 Netherlands policy for participat
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Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
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“The objectives of this stabilisa
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In December 2005, the Netherlands g
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The expectation is that meaningful
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3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
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4 Implementation of the mission and
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tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
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such as the Bushmaster, that was be
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Afghan partner unit, at all times o
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northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
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in large and small bases, while con
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previously thought and comprised a
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Apart from facilitating training an
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If operations in close proximity of
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As previously mentioned, the preven
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- Between 2006 and 2010, the number
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government of Chora in January 2010
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At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76: purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78: In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80: 5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82: Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84: expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86: Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88: explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90: this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92: organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94: occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96: Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98: 6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100: The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102: At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104: province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106: area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107: ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 111 and 112: Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114: Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116: end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118: Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120: Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122: Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124: EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126: Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128: Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130: July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132: Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133: Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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