Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

More documents

Recommendations

Info

ealistic security plan for Uruzgan province and lobbied to implementnational programmes for capacity build-up of security troops in Uruzgan.During the mission, the Netherlands made a substantial contribution at thenational level of EUR 22.6 million to the ANA Trust Fund, managed byNATO, for strengthening the Afghan army. The funding was intended forprocurement of non-lethal materiel.One important national programme for the funding of the police force wasthe Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). The LOTFA has beenfinancing the build-up of the police apparatus (Afghan National Police[ANP]) since 2002. The LOFTA was managed by the UNDP. The core tasksof the fund were the payment of police salaries, capacity development ofthe police force and the Ministry of the Interior, improvement of the police’sequipment and infrastructure, lending support to the prison service andincreasing the number of women in the police force. Police salariesaccounted for approximately 90% of LOFTA’s total budget. The mostimportant contributors to the budget were Japan, the United States, theEuropean Commission, Canada and the Netherlands. During the June 2008conference in Paris, the Netherlands pledged a contribution of EUR 10million for the 2008-2011 period, that it has since paid.From 2007, the 4 th Brigade of the 205 th Corps of the Afghan army was alsopresent in Uruzgan. During the mission, this Afghan military presence wasincreased to include four infantry kandaks 12 and two support kandaks. AnISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) was attached to eachunit to advise and mentor the unit in the execution of its operational tasks.In Uruzgan, these OMLTs were provided by the Netherlands, France, theCzech Republic and Australia. Afghan units were coupled with ISAF units asmuch as possible in order to better enable them to operate autonomously inthe future. As much as possible, operations were prepared and executedcollectively. Later on during the mission, the Afghan units planned andexecuted their operations independently on a more regular basis. Examplesof this are the security operations surrounding the 2009 presidentialelections and the 2010 parliamentary elections. The Afghan army showed astrong qualitative improvement owing to the mentoring of the OMLTs andthe partnering with international units. Particularly during 2009 and 2010,increasingly larger operations were prepared and executed by the Afghanarmy, with ISAF units shifting from a leading role to an advisory role.Right from the beginning of the mission, there was also a focus on thebuild-up of a sound police apparatus in Uruzgan. After the extension of themission in 2007, the Netherlands’ focus on the Afghan police intensifiedand, from that moment onwards, policy centred more on the build-up of thepolice force in terms of quality. At the start of the mission, the capabilitiesof the police in Uruzgan were very limited. From 2006, PRTs conductedpolice training courses. Between 2006 and 2008, approximately 1,000Afghans were trained for service in the Afghan National Auxiliary Police(ANAP), which became part of ANP in 2008. The idea of an auxiliary policeforce of low quality turned out to be an unstable concept and the ANAPshowed a large turnover of personnel. What remained of the ANAP wasincorporated into the ANP. The Netherlands was an advocate of thedeployment of EUPOL, the European Police Mission, in Uruzgan. EUPOLarrived in the province in 2009 and has since contributed to increasing thecapabilities of ANP commanders in the area.12 A kandak is an Afghan army unit of battalion size with a strength of approximately 600 men.Page 44 of 133
Apart from facilitating training and mentoring, the Netherlands set up anumber of infrastructure projects for the police force in Uruzgan, such ascheckpoints and police stations. The Netherlands built a police trainingcentre on the periphery of Kamp Holland in Tarin Kowt so that policeofficers could be trained in their home province. The instructors at thiscentre were from the TFU and EUPOL. From March 2008, Dutch EUPOLtrainers were also active in Tarin Kowt. Since the opening of the centre inMarch 2009, over 800 police officers have completed basic training. That isover half of the total number of police officers now active in Uruzgan. TheNetherlands also contributed to ‘on-the-job’ training by deploying PoliceMentoring Teams to the area in late 2008. Initially, the Netherlands sentthree teams, a number that was increased to five in 2009. The deploymentof these teams led to clear further improvement of the quality of the policeforce.An additional training programme, led by ISAF, was conducted for theAfghan police per province. Local police units being trained weretemporarily replaced by Afghan police units from other provinces. Despitethese efforts, the police apparatus remained a weak link in the Afghansecurity system. A 2009 evaluation 13 stated that the quality of the Afghanpolice force was lagging far behind the quantity. The Netherlands thereforepressed for good coordination between the LOFTA and other contributors,for an intensification of LOFTA investment in capacity-building at theMinistry of the Interior, and for an increase in the quality of the police force.Steps have been taken, but in comparison to the army, the capabilities ofthe police force in Uruzgan remained weak. Corruption in the Afghan policeforce is still a major problem and this is reflected in the local people’sperception of the police. The army is respected and appreciated more thanthe police force. Local people often still see the police as being badly trainedand ill-mannered and does not feel that the police is protecting theirinterests.4.3.8 International cooperation4.3.8.1 Lead nationIn the 2006-2010 period, the Netherlands was lead nation in Uruzgan. Theassociated tasks, powers and responsibilities lay primarily in the area oflogistics. As lead nation, the Netherlands was the largest supplier of troopsand the facilitator of much of the logistic and infrastructure activities in theprovince. However, Dutch mission command was not solely responsible forsecurity in the whole province. Various partners, such as ISAF and OEF,acted independently of the Netherlands in the province. In most cases, butnot all, such activities were discussed, and if possible coordinated inadvance with Dutch military command. In practice, the TFU was unable toenforce that coordination with partners but had to depend on theirwillingness to cooperate. During the mission, much time was invested ingood coordination and cooperation with partners and, despite sometimescontrasting views and approaches, it can be said that activities of partnersdid not lead to real conflicts with the TFU’s operations and activities.However, contrasting views regarding the approach to tackling informalleaders (see paragraph 4.4.3) did form an obstacle in implementing aneffective policy aimed at restricting the influence of power brokers andwarlords.13 TLO: Three Years Later, 2009Page 45 of 133
Page 1 and 2: Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4: High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8: Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10: Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12: 1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14: The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19 and 20: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 21 and 22: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 23 and 24: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43: previously thought and comprised a
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76: purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78: In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80: 5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82: Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84: expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86: Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88: explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90: this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92: organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94: occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96:
Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98:
6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100:
The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102:
At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104:
province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106:
area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108:
ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110:
d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112:
Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114:
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116:
end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
show all

Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?