Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

government of Chora in January 2010, made possible by the renovation ofthe building with Dutch resources. This project contributed to making thedistrict government better able to carry out its administrative work.The visibility of government in Uruzgan in 2010 has improved since 2006.After decades of absence, district governments were set up in two districts(Deh Rawod and Chora) following efforts made by the Netherlands. Thepopulation in these areas is once again involved in politics, after a longabsence of formal government. This is a step in the right direction.During the course of the mission, the Netherlands continuously advocated,both at the national and international levels (e.g. during variousinternational conferences on Afghanistan), a broad, national capacitybuildingprogramme. In June 2010, the Afghan government approved theSub-National Governance Policy Framework on the basis of agreementsmade during the London conference. This acted as the new Afghan nationalpolicy framework for the improvement of local government, with subframeworksfor financial management, capacity development and tacklingcorruption.Sub-conclusion on capacity-building:Despite all of the initiatives taken, capacity-building in the area ofgovernance was laborious. The figures show moderate progress in thequantitative capacity of formal local governance; from 20% to 30% interms of staffing, as the TLO report states. Although, by the end of themission, the positions of governor and chief-of-police were manned in alldistricts, a large proportion of the other positions remained vacant. Thismeans that by late 2010, capacity shortfalls were still among the biggestproblems for the development of good governance.4.4.2 Transparency and integrityIn addition to capacity-building, one of the policy priorities in place was toenhance the legitimacy of local government by improving transparency andintegrity. At the start of the mission, government organisations did nothave a great deal of legitimacy among the local population. Variousproblems, among them the dominance of the Popolzai tribe in localgovernment positions, played a part in this phenomenon. In addition,appointments were almost always based on personal relations with highplacedprovincial or national government officials or even the President,instead of on qualifications for the job. Large-scale corruption withinprovincial government and failure to apply financial control mechanismswere further problems in this area.The 2007 Article 100 letter announced the intensification of Dutch policyregarding the support and mentoring of local governance in Uruzgan.Increasing the transparency and integrity of local governance was meant toincrease the population’s confidence in local government organisations, inturn resulting in acceptance and greater effectiveness of theseorganisations. At national level, the Netherlands pressed for theappointment of government officials known for their personal integrity.In the context of transparency and integrity, the Netherlands alsoadvocated a policy of appointing suitable candidates for jobs. As part of theNetherlands’ efforts in this field, the Netherlands lobbied for provincial civilservants who did not belong to the Popolzai tribe and were of goodreputation. On a number of occasions, the Dutch lobby met with success.For example, Jan Mohammed Khan resigned before the Dutch missionbegan and a governor with a better reputation, Munib, was appointed toPage 53 of 133