Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

At the beginning of the Dutch mission, the Netherlands insisted that he giveup his position as governor on account of his violent and corrupt past. Hisdeparture was a condition for deployment of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan.Jan Mohammed Khan was eventually forced to resign by President Karzai,but did, however, retain a great deal of influence over day-to-day affairs inUruzgan from a position behind the scenes. He was, together with hiscousin Matiullah Khan, the most important power broker in Uruzgan. Dutchpolicy regarding these two power brokers of ill repute was to avoidintensive cooperation with them. However, in practical terms, the issue ofavoiding doing business with these power brokers turned out to be anextremely complex matter.The main effort of the mission was primarily in support of the legitimateAfghan government. The activities of, for example, warlord Matiullah Khancould potentially have contributed to creating a certain form of security,albeit that his activities were not necessarily aimed at strengthening officialAfghan government authority but more at strengthening his own position ofpower. It was also known that, in the past, Matiullah Khan, together withJan Mohammed Khan, had marginalised large parts of the population. Forthat reason, the Netherlands was of the opinion that the influence ofMatiullah Khan and Jan Mohammed Khan should be used in a controlledway. That could only be done if the two power brokers were prepared torecognise the authority of the local government and take into account thewishes and vision of all population groups and tribes when carrying outtheir activities. A policy was adopted of only working with Matiullah Khan ifhe was under Afghan government leadership. The Netherlands also decidednot to take part in shura meetings initiated and organised by MatiullahKhan. The Netherlands urged ISAF partners to follow the same course ofaction.The Netherlands also made efforts to integrate Matiullah Khan’s men intothe formal Afghan police force structures. From 2007 onwards, MatiullahKhan’s men (the Kandak Amniante Uruzgan –KAU) no longer had anyformal raison d’être and should have been part of the Afghan police force.In practice, Matiullah Khan’s men operated as a militia group, checkingtraffic on the most important roads in and out of Uruzgan and generatinghigh revenues for the warlord in the process. This militia group was notunder supervision of the Afghan government. Unfortunately, at the nationallevel, there was too little Afghan political will and drive to bring MatiullahKhan’s militia to an end, leaving him complete freedom of action to followhis own path and carry on with his activities.Despite this, the policy implemented by the Netherlands did result inwinning the confidence of other tribes that had previously beenmarginalised. These disadvantaged tribes had in the past often soughtsupport from the Taliban in their tribal struggle against the power of thePopolzai tribe of Jan Mohammed Khan and Matiullah Khan. As the presenceof and protection afforded by Dutch troops gave them the opportunity toonce again get involved in local governance, the support of suchdisadvantaged tribes for the Taliban gradually, but noticeably, started todiminish.One problem with the stringent Dutch policy towards power brokers wasthat it did not allow the Dutch mission leadership to enter into dialogue withJan Mohammed Khan and Matiullah Khan who, in practical terms, still helda great deal of informal power and resources with which they could obstructformal government officials in their activities. This was in direct contrast toISAF and OEF partners in the area, who did cooperate with them, especiallyPage 55 of 133