Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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(ANA) were understaffed and underequipped. Many policemen and militarypersonnel had ties with informal local leaders and they were loyal to thecentral authority to a limited extent only.In terms of human development, Uruzgan occupied the 30 th position amongthe 32 provinces of Afghanistan. The poor security situation, insufficientlocal capacity and poor infrastructure had caused the province to becomeisolated and hindered reconstruction and development. The possibilities foreconomic growth of the province were very limited. Uruzgan remainedpractically untouched by national Afghan development programmes. At thestart of the mission, there were only five local NGOs (ADA, AHDS, ANCC,ARCS and CADG) operating in the province. The presence of governmentservices such as education and health care was minimal. In 2006, therewere only two qualified doctors active in all of Uruzgan. Women and girlshad virtually no access to schools and hospitals. Child and maternalmortality rates were extremely high, as was the illiteracy rate.Approximately 20% of the children between 7 and 13 years old went toschool, 97% of whom were boys. There was a great shortage of femaleteachers. No official primary and secondary schools existed in the province.The population was largely dependent on small-scale agriculture.Productivity of local agriculture had dropped sharply in the preceding yearsas a result of the long period of conflict and drought.In order to enable the Afghan authorities to provide more stability andsecurity to the population, the Netherlands directed part of its efforts atincreasing the effectiveness of governance in Uruzgan. It was expresslydecided to operate via Afghan government structures and to makeinvestments in acquiring knowledge and understanding of the localcircumstances.The Article 100 letter of 2007 contained the following passage:“A number of important new emphases will be placed in the new mission:• more resources will be devoted to supporting and promoting thereconstruction effort by the Afghan government and nongovernmentalorganisations (NGOs). In addition, the support for andcoaching of the development of adequate governance will beintensified;• the training and coaching of Afghan security organisations will beintensified, in order to help the Afghan army and the Afghan policeestablish effective control over the main inhabited areas andconnecting roads.”3.2 Combat mission or reconstruction mission?Particularly during the initial stage of the mission, there was a great deal ofdebate in the Netherlands about the question whether the Netherlands’contribution constituted a “combat mission” or a “reconstruction mission”.The Article 100 letters did not refer to the mission in either of these terms.The letters did make clear, however, that the mission would not focus solelyon promoting security and stability but also on creating the conditions foradministrative and economic development. As the mission progressed, itbecame increasingly clear that combat duties had to be performed withfrequency in order to further improve security in the province and providebetter protection to Afghan citizens. At the same time, it was stronglybelieved that reconstruction activities and diplomacy were also necessaryfor the sustainability of any contribution to improving stability and security.The Article 100 letter of 2007 contains the following statement:Page 22 of 133
“The objectives of this stabilisation and support mission, which is aimed atthe transfer of tasks, are a combination of security and development. Afterall, development cannot be rooted in an insecure environment, and securityincreases if the population has prospects for development and is governedwith integrity. This approach continues to be ruled by the maxim:’reconstruction where possible and military action where necessary’.”The investments in tribal dialogue and cooperation in the area of goodgovernance were also to a great extent intended to enhance stability andsecurity of the province. The numerous investments in socio-economicdevelopment were aimed at convincing the population that the Afghancentral government, assisted by the international community, acted in thepeople’s interest and that it was developing as a reliable, competent andservice-providing government. Eventually, the role of insurgents shouldbecome irrelevant to Afghan citizens, which in turn would improve securityfurther. The mission was based on the assumption that there could be noreconstruction without better security, and that sustainable improvement ofthe security situation depended on the progress made in the area ofreconstruction.Page 23 of 133
Page 1 and 2: Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4: High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8: Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10: Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12: 1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14: The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16: 2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19 and 20: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 21: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67 and 68: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 69 and 70: tailored to the real needs of the p
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74:
The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76:
purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78:
In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80:
5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82:
Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84:
expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86:
Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88:
explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90:
this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92:
organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94:
occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96:
Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98:
6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100:
The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102:
At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104:
province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106:
area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108:
ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110:
d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112:
Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114:
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116:
end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118:
Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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