Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

expenditure related to the deployment of the armed forces as lead nation inUruzgan would amount to. No financial room was budgeted for significantunforeseen expenditure. Due to operational requirements and changes inthe parameters of the mission, however, there were indeed unforeseenexpenses. As a result, the participation of the Netherlands armed forces inAfghanistan involved significantly higher spending than had been estimatedat the outset. This mainly related to the first two years. When the missionwas extended in late 2007, an estimate was drawn up which was betteraligned with the expenditure.Efficient use of financial resourcesIn principle, the HGIS system only accommodates additional expenditure ifit is related to a mission. That means that expenditure related to theregular, day-to-day operations of the Defence organisation, as well asinvestments related to missions such as the purchase of the Bushmaster,must be funded from the regular Defence budget. This may foster inefficientuse of resources. Repair may be favoured over replacement, or hiringtemporary personnel favoured over permanent personnel. Transportexpenditure for the return of materiel to the Netherlands could in certaincases amount to more than the intrinsic value of the materiel itself. In orderto prevent this as much as possible, the decision was made to allow anexception to the HGIS rules for the Dutch participation in ISAF if itdemonstrably led to more efficiency, in consultation with the ministries ofForeign Affairs and Finance. EUR 1.5 million was then transferred from theHGIS budget to the DMO part of the regular Defence budget. As a result,the Logistic Support Unit (LSU) in Eygelshoven could be kept open longerfor repair work to materiel brought back from Uruzgan. In June 2010, theUnited States had decided to leave this support unit, which was on Dutchterritory. Dutch support personnel then fell under the Defenceorganisation's social policy framework. Instead of having relativelyexpensive externally hired personnel carry out the necessary repair workarising from the deployment in Afghanistan, it was decided that anexception would be made to the HGIS rules and the work would be carriedout by LSU personnel. As a result, the actual expenditure for this work,funded by the HGIS, was less. Apart from the HGIS rules, in a number ofcases it proved more efficient to sell materiel from the mission, such ascontainers, locally in Uruzgan and buy new materiel in the Netherlands.Political decision-making also prompted focus on efficiency. This was thecase, for instance, during the debate in 2010 on extension of the missionand the possible participation in the police training mission in Kunduz.During the redeployment, materiel that could be used in a possible newmission was scheduled last in line for transport back to the Netherlands.This saved on transport costs, as much of this materiel was indeed neededin Kunduz.Sub-conclusionIn principle, the HGIS system only accommodates additional expenditurefor the Defence organisation if it is related to a mission. Capital investmentsand running costs that are part of the day-to-day operations of theorganisation are not funded by the HGIS. The rules can foster inefficientuse of government funds. These efficiency considerations were taken intoaccount with regard to the expenditure for the armed forces’ deployment toAfghanistan. If it demonstrably led to more efficiency, and only inconsultation with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, in certainspecific cases the decision was made to allow an exception to the HGISrules by transferring funds from the HGIS part of the Defence budget to theregular Defence budget.Page 83 of 133