Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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Livestock was set up under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture(MAIL) and the FAO. In the field of governance, the Uruzgan Sub-nationalGovernance working group was organised in cooperation with IDLG. Inaddition, there was a Provincial Medical Board for all actors in the healthsector. As from the end of 2008, two-weekly discussions were held for allNGOs operating in Uruzgan. Closer coordination with civilian actors alsorequired a larger civilian team: this grew, as mentioned above, from threeto twelve political and development-cooperation advisers.The Netherlands worked hard to convince UNAMA to adopt a strongercoordinating role in the province. This paid off when, at the end of 2008,SVSG Kai Eide decided to open an office in Uruzgan. Although in manyrespects the PRT continued to play a central role, it was in practice just oneof the many players in the field of reconstruction. As a consequence, theTFU had less insight into and control over the various reconstructionprocesses in the province, but on the other hand these developmentactivities were no longer entirely dependent on the ISAF presence.4.5.5.3 Relationship with and security of aid organisationsRespect for the mandate and the expertise of the various actors was ofgreat importance. NGOs guarded their autonomy vigilantly and did not wishto be associated directly with ISAF. Development was the domain of thecentral and provincial governments and the civilian actors with expertise inthese fields. Programmes had to be kept separate from the militarypresence and the PRT in order to keep them from being seen as a part ofthe conflict. Contacts between the donors and the NGOs were thereforemaintained via the Embassy in Kabul. It was also very important for theNGOs to be visibly independent of the military operation. At the same time,it was desirable that the military units could defend the NGOs inemergencies. It was important to have agreements in place for theprovision of military support in exceptional cases, medical assistance and, ifwished, air transport. There were also regular discussions about thesecurity situation, in which the PRT and NGOs exchanged information. Inthe course of 2009 and 2010, more and more NGOs discovered the benefitsof working with the PRT. Visiting a project under military escort was still outof the question, but the NGOs did not mind meeting the (civil part of the)PRT for talks at Kamp Holland or on neutral territory such as the UN officeor at the governor’s compound.4.5.5.4 Cooperation with Dutch NGOsIn 2006, three Dutch NGOs (Save the Children, HealthNet TPO and Cordaid)decided to join forces in the Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan (DCU). In 2008,another two Dutch NGOs joined the DCU, namely ZOA (Relief, Hope andRecovery) and the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan - VeterinaryProgrammes (DCA).The DCU focused on improving a number of basic provisions in the provinceof Uruzgan:• civil society and institutional development (all, ZOA in particular)• health care (Healthnet/TPO)• education (Save the Children)• social development (Save the Children)• rural development (ZOA and CORDAID)• livestock and animal health (DCA).The DCU had a permanent presence in the provincial capital Tarin Kowt andoperated independently of the TFU. By working together with the localpopulation and local organisations, the DCU's programme of activities wasPage 68 of 133
tailored to the real needs of the people and thus gained added value.Particular attention was paid to capacity building of the local partners andthe local government.Consultation with the Dutch NGOs (for example in the AfghanistanPlatform) took place not only in the field, but also in The Hague. Thisconsultation was attended not only by the NGOs in the DCU, but also byother Dutch NGOs working in Afghanistan. These meetings enabled opendiscussion between the NGOs and the ministries of Foreign Affairs andDefence.Sub-conclusion on civil domainRight from the start, the Netherlands worked specifically with Afghanorganisations. In this way, the foundations were laid to enable nationalprogrammes, larger national and international NGOs and UN organisationsto operate more safely. The integrated Dutch efforts resulted in a greatmany NGOs being brought into the province and the various activities beingcoordinated in close consultation with the local authorities and, from May2009, with UNAMA as well. The presence of UNAMA functioned as a symbolof the international civil presence and meant in practice that thecoordination of relief activities was also supported by the PRT. However, theabsence of a properly functioning government focal point made things a lotmore difficult for the mission in the last few years. The lack of trustbetween NGOs and the government was also detrimental to theeffectiveness of the deployment.It was essential to guarantee the independent character of NGOs, so as notto compromise their security. Successful deployment of civil relieforganisations required them to be autonomous and not an extension ofISAF. Respect for the mandate and the expertise of the various actors hadto be a first priority. Discretion with regard to the programme, actors andactivities was necessary. It was vital that external actors should keep a lowprofile in order not to endanger local communities and their organisations.4.5.6 Sectoral deploymentAt first, the Netherlands had intended to concentrate on a limited number ofsectors. However, since the Netherlands was the main donor and leadnation, it became more and more difficult to ignore certain sectors in viewof the desire to meet the local needs and set up coherently relatedactivities.During the whole period of the mission, the independent Afghan researchorganisation TLO studied the results of the Dutch engagement in Uruzgan.In its 2010 report 25 , TLO identified positive results achieved by the Dutch3D approach in Uruzgan. TLO concluded that after four years, theNetherlands could leave in the knowledge that the mission had contributedto security and development in Uruzgan. The Dutch deployment in Uruzganwas considered as a model of successful civil-military cooperation in thecontext of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. TLO also pointed out that thesustainability of the achievement would be dependent on the continuationof the Dutch efforts by the new ISAF partners, the US and Australia,together with the Afghan government.In order to ensure that ongoing projects are kept on the right track, aPOLAD/OSAD has been posted in Uruzgan until the end of 2011. Inaddition, where possible and necessary, the Netherlands tried to transfer25 TLO: “The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 - 2010. A TLO socio-political assessment”Page 69 of 133
Page 1 and 2:
Final evaluationNetherlands contrib
Page 3 and 4:
High mountainsLow mountainsPlains a
Page 5 and 6:
Table of ContentsDutch military per
Page 7 and 8:
Dutch military personnel deceased i
Page 9 and 10:
Page 9 of 133
Page 11 and 12:
1 IntroductionThe government would,
Page 13 and 14:
The structure of the final evaluati
Page 15 and 16:
2 The international presence in Afg
Page 17 and 18: insurgents in, particularly, the ea
Page 19 and 20: 3 Netherlands policy for participat
Page 21 and 22: Netherlands’ presence. Furthermor
Page 23 and 24: “The objectives of this stabilisa
Page 25 and 26: In December 2005, the Netherlands g
Page 27 and 28: The expectation is that meaningful
Page 29 and 30: 3.6.2 Implementation of national pr
Page 31 and 32: 4 Implementation of the mission and
Page 33 and 34: tasks to fulfil in the area of secu
Page 35 and 36: such as the Bushmaster, that was be
Page 37 and 38: Afghan partner unit, at all times o
Page 39 and 40: northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007.
Page 41 and 42: in large and small bases, while con
Page 43 and 44: previously thought and comprised a
Page 45 and 46: Apart from facilitating training an
Page 47 and 48: If operations in close proximity of
Page 49 and 50: As previously mentioned, the preven
Page 51 and 52: - Between 2006 and 2010, the number
Page 53 and 54: government of Chora in January 2010
Page 55 and 56: At the beginning of the Dutch missi
Page 57 and 58: intermediary of TLO and political a
Page 59 and 60: interest for filling judicial posit
Page 61 and 62: During the Uruzgan mission, a great
Page 63 and 64: structurally change governance in U
Page 65 and 66: development programmes. Before the
Page 67: also the way in which Afghans perce
Page 71 and 72: Gizab had increased and there was a
Page 73 and 74: The DCU programme devoted and still
Page 75 and 76: purpose of these loans, cooperative
Page 77 and 78: In view of the lack of enthusiasm a
Page 79 and 80: 5 Expenditure for the mission and i
Page 81 and 82: Overview of long-term expenditure a
Page 83 and 84: expenditure related to the deployme
Page 85 and 86: Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Aff
Page 87 and 88: explosive ordnance disposal, armour
Page 89 and 90: this situation as constraining, for
Page 91 and 92: organised at a later stage. In addi
Page 93 and 94: occupational social workers and the
Page 95 and 96: Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the
Page 97 and 98: 6 ConclusionsThis chapter begins wi
Page 99 and 100: The first part of the central quest
Page 101 and 102: At the end of 2005, the Afghan auth
Page 103 and 104: province. This, too, was done by me
Page 105 and 106: area, increased sales of agricultur
Page 107 and 108: ISAF and the OEF led to extra coord
Page 109 and 110: d. The recommendations from advisor
Page 111 and 112: Page 111 of 133
Page 113 and 114: Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchm
Page 115 and 116: end-2010, reforms will strengthen t
Page 117 and 118: Afghan Cultural HeritageA comprehen
Page 119 and 120:
Private Sector Development and Trad
Page 121 and 122:
Annex B, Results of the socio-econo
Page 123 and 124:
EducationTLO data:• In 2006 there
Page 125 and 126:
Overview of the number of children
Page 127 and 128:
Annex C, Chronology200522 December:
Page 129 and 130:
July: microcredit provider World Co
Page 131 and 132:
Annex D, List of abbreviations3DADZ
Page 133:
Page 133 of 133
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Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

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