Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

such as the Bushmaster, that was better suited to operating under theseconditions than the vehicles normally used by the Defence organisation, i.e.the YPR-765, the Patria, the Viking and the Mercedes-Benz terrain vehicle.Tactical air transport with transport helicopters emerged as a goodalternative for avoiding the threat of IEDs and moving troops around thewhole mission area rapidly, while maintaining the element of surprise. Thenumber of helicopters available for the task was, however, a restrictingfactor. The helicopters supplied by the Netherlands were assigned to thecommander of Regional Command South (C-RC-S) and were notimmediately available to the commander of the TFU.The method of operation related to the COIN doctrine demanded manymore enablers than are required during other types of operation; extraenablers were particularly required for counter-IED capabilities (whichinclude, for example, engineer capability for detecting and clearing IEDs,electronic warfare resources for jamming IED detonators, airreconnaissance and surveillance assets and medical personnel). Thenumber of available enablers formed a restricting factor for the deploymentof the manoeuvre units of the BG, which meant constantly weighing up theimportance of the planned operation against the efforts made in freeing upsufficient numbers of enablers for effective execution of the operation.4.3.2 Command structureThe Deployment Task Force (DTF) deployed to southern Afghanistan (RC-S)in 2006 when the region was still under the responsibility of OEF. The DTFapplied the rules of engagement of ISAF and did not fall under the umbrellaof OEF.After the start of the mission on 1 August 2006, the TFU came under RC-Sin the ISAF command structure. RC-S itself was subordinate to thecommander of ISAF in Kabul. In 2009, an extra level of command, ISAFJoint Command (IJC), was built into the command structure between thecommander of the ISAF and the regional commanders. In addition todirection from ISAF, the Dutch mission was also directed from The Hagueby the Military Operations Steering Group (SMO).The ATF’s F-16s were directly under command of ISAF headquarters inKabul. The attack and transport helicopters were under operationalcommand of the commander of RC-S.The special units of Task Force 55 fell under command of the ISAF’sCommander of Special Forces (COMISAFSOF) in Kabul, who in turn cameunder the commander of ISAF.The commander of the TFU had command of the BG and the PRT. In 2009,a change was made when the PRT came under civilian leadership of thecivilian representative (CIVREP), a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officialoperating on an equal footing with the commander of the TFU.The CHOD had full command of all Dutch military units at all times.4.3.3 Rules of engagementThe robust Rules of Engagement (ROE) were set for ISAF by NATO’s NorthAtlantic Council (NAC) on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. TheNetherlands had set in place a number of caveats for Dutch militarypersonnel regarding the ROE. These concerned, among other things, thedetention of persons and lending support to troops operating under themandate of OEF.Page 35 of 133