Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

intermediary of TLO and political and cultural advisers, an intensivedialogue was in place with influential tribal leaders in Uruzgan, Kandahar,Kabul, and even in Pakistan. In 2008, the policy with regard to informalleaders or powerbrokers was formalised by RC-S for the whole ISAF in thesouth. RC-S identified all the powerbrokers in the south of Afghanistan. RC-S, together with the TFU, determined an individual approach for eachpowerbroker. The programme ran from 2009 to the end of the mission in2010. The main players in Uruzgan were the non-Popolzai leaders who werekeen to work with ISAF and the Afghan government. The regions in whichthese players held sway were, in particular, Deh Rafshan, parts of theMirabad valley and parts of the district of Chora.Solid results have been achieved in the areas of representation and tribalbalance. Although the Popalzai still occupy the majority of governmentpositions, the number of members of other – previously disadvantaged –tribes in local government has increased. This has resulted in tribes such asthe Barakzai, Ghilzai/Tokhi and Achekzai regaining representation inprovincial politics. The influence of informal power structures frequentlyformed a greater obstacle to the development of good governance than theinfluence of the Taliban. The relatively large influence of the Taliban (seealso paragraph 3.4.1) was seen by the Netherlands as a consequence of thetribal imbalance in the province. This perception turned out to be correct.The efforts of the Dutch to solve the problem of tribal imbalance resulted inreduced support for the Taliban. Especially in the case of the Ghilzai(including the Tokhi) and the Barakzai, this Dutch policy led to a moresecure situation and increased government control of areas in Uruzgan. Thepopulation welcomed this emphasis on tribal balance and the policy of‘develop where possible, take military action where necessary.This does not, however, mean that the people’s faith in national politics hasimproved. For example, members of the Ghilzai tribe did not nominate anycandidates for positions in the Wolesi Jirga (the Afghan House ofRepresentatives) because they had no trust in the national elections beingcarried out fairly and honestly. In general, the turn-out at elections in thesouthern provinces has fallen, which confirms the impression that thepeople do not have much confidence in national politics.A large part of the population considers the improvements in the field ofgood governance as an achievement of the Dutch and not due in part to theefforts of local government 22 . This is further evidence of the localpopulation’s lack of confidence in local government. Once it became clearthat the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan would come to an end, the localleaders, especially of the tribes that had been marginalised in the past,started to get worried because they feared that the tribal balance wouldswing against them after the Dutch withdrawal 23 . This demonstrates thatthe Dutch efforts in support of the local leaders and population wereappreciated. During the transfer to the Australian and US troops, the Dutchexplained their approach to tribal balance to their successors.Sub-conclusion on representation and tribal balanceThe Dutch efforts to reduce tribal imbalance resulted in a fall in thepopulation’s support for the Taliban in certain areas. Especially in the caseof the Ghilzai (including the Tokhi) and the Barakzai, this policy led to amore secure situation and increased government control of areas inUruzgan. In any case, the mission put an end to the one-sided dominantposition of the Popolzai tribe and the Australian and American successors22 TLO 2010, p. 2823 TLO 2010, p. 53-54Page 57 of 133