Final evaluation Netherlands participation in ISAF 2006 - 2010

At the end of 2005, the Afghan authorities had little to no influence inconsiderable parts of the province. The security situation was poor and theinsurgents had extensive freedom of action. During the mission, theNetherlands succeeded in providing greater security for the populationcentres and thus for the majority of the people of Uruzgan. There was greatfear among the population that the insurgents would return. The protectionwhich the Netherlands was able to provide to the civilian population was attimes temporary and localised, depending on the situation. Not always werethere sufficient numbers of (Dutch) ISAF troops or ANSF personnel availablefor that protection to be permanent.In the first years of the ink blot strategy, operations at the high end of thespectrum of force were necessary on a regular basis. Confrontationsbetween the insurgents and ISAF troops led to casualties among our ownunits and among the local population. The combination of, on the one hand,the high level of force and, on the other, operations involving social patrolsand outreach activities by mission teams demanded a high level of flexibilityfrom the personnel. The units proved to be very capable of carrying outthese activities, even if they were conducted close together in terms of timeand space. This had a positive impact on the effectiveness of theoperations. The freedom of movement of the PRT and the civilian expertsand diplomats was limited by the security situation. Within the ink blot, too,the PRT sometimes required force protection from the Battle Group, butthat protection was not always available. At times this hampered theactivities of the PRT. The activities of the American, Australian and Dutchspecial forces outside the ink blot were essential in relieving the pressureon the ink blot.ResultsOwing in part to Dutch efforts, the presence of the Afghan army increasedin the province of Uruzgan. In 2006, the Afghan army’s presence in theprovince was very limited and the police apparatus was weak. From 2007,more attention was focused on building up a properly functioning policeapparatus. In 2010, the effective size of the 4 th brigade in Uruzgan wasapproximately 3,200 personnel. In the period up to 2010, the Netherlandstrained around 1,000 police officers.With the gradual expansion of the ink blots, an increasing number of thepopulation were brought under the protection of ISAF and the Afghanauthorities, despite the pressure from and influence of the insurgents.The Dutch ink blot strategy was based on the premise that after a certainperiod of time, the Afghan security services would be able to maintainsecurity in the relatively safe areas largely without assistance. That wouldfree up capacity to expand the ink blot further. The independence of theANSF envisaged in the Article 100 letter, including the transfer ofresponsibility of security in the populated areas, was not achieved duringthe mission, however. This laid extra claims on the Dutch ISAF units.The ink blot areas were expanded over a period of four years. In 2010, thearea controlled by ISAF and the Afghan army and police included more thanhalf of the population of the province. Economic activity increased andNGOs found their way to the province. The improved security situation is,however, fragile and not irreversible.6.2.4 Sub-conclusion: Good governanceObjectivePage 101 of 133