Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
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Procurement process design<br />
One way in which quality can be controlled <strong>for</strong>, even if contracts are incomplete,<br />
is by making it an explicit part of the process <strong>for</strong> evaluating bids. Tendering <strong>for</strong><br />
a prison management contract takes the <strong>for</strong>m of a beauty contest, with price just<br />
one criterion on which bidders compete. Other criteria related to quality of<br />
service may be assigned equal or greater weight in the decision process and in<br />
many cases the bid accepted is not the lowest price bid.<br />
Contract design and contract monitoring<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
Critics of prison privatisation in the US have pointed to evidence of quality<br />
shading, lending support to the Hart et al. (1997) conclusion that prison service<br />
quality is non-contractible and is there<strong>for</strong>e likely to suffer from the involvement<br />
of the private sector. Quality shading in the US has been observed particularly in<br />
relation to staffing levels and qualifications. However, the UK experience so far<br />
demonstrates that it is possible to contract <strong>for</strong> quality if sufficient resources are<br />
devoted to contract design and monitoring. The UK system is now described in<br />
detail below.<br />
The winning bidder taking on management of a prison signed a contract with the<br />
Commissioner <strong>for</strong> Correctional Services, whose post was replaced by the Chief<br />
Executive of NOMS on 1 June 2004. Each contract sets out the level of service<br />
that contractors are expected to provide, the payment system and the<br />
mechanisms by which the Commissioner/Chief Executive can make financial<br />
deductions <strong>for</strong> poor per<strong>for</strong>mance. Individually negotiated contracts are linked to<br />
a national monitoring system that applies to all prisons, whether privately or<br />
publicly managed. Fifteen Key Per<strong>for</strong>mance Indicators (KPIs) measure whether<br />
the Prison Service as a whole is meeting its objectives of protecting the public<br />
and reducing crime. For example, one KPI <strong>for</strong> 2005/6 is to ensure that the rate of<br />
escapes is less than 0.05 per cent of the average prison population. National KPIs<br />
are supported by 48 Key Per<strong>for</strong>mance Targets (KPTs) that measure the<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance of individual prisons against planned activities. Target figures are<br />
agreed on an individual prison basis, and vary according to the nature of the<br />
centre concerned. For example, each prison will agree to keep escapes below an<br />
appropriate level, in order to ensure that the national KPI is achieved. Contracts<br />
have recently been adapted to incorporate the same KPTs that apply to public<br />
prisons, with annual per<strong>for</strong>mance measures defined in relation to the<br />
appropriate KPTs. Per<strong>for</strong>mance measurement in relation to individual contracts<br />
is addressed in further detail below.<br />
In addition, contractors are obliged to comply with national operational<br />
requirements laid out in primary and secondary legislation, Prison Service<br />
Standards, Prison Service Orders and Prison Service Instructions. Compliance<br />
with these requirements is measured by the Prison Service Standards Audit unit,<br />
which allocates each prison an overall rating of superior, good, acceptable,<br />
deficient or unacceptable on the basis of its visits.<br />
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