Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
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Controlling <strong>for</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation problems<br />
The provision of sufficient in<strong>for</strong>mation was ensured through the measures<br />
outlined above to limit inequality. In addition, local authorities made in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
as easy to access as possible and offered support in analysing in<strong>for</strong>mation if<br />
requested to reduce the burden of choice on the user.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice 134<br />
If insufficient in<strong>for</strong>mation was available or the burden of choice too great <strong>for</strong><br />
rational choices to be made, we would expect to see this reflected in a lack of<br />
searching and bidding behaviour. Available evidence on consumers’ willingness<br />
to bear search costs is positive, with one pilot surveying applicants and finding<br />
that 85 per cent of respondents were looking in the paper every week <strong>for</strong> adverts.<br />
However, most pilots that examined the issue suggest that whilst many<br />
participants were actively searching <strong>for</strong> properties, bidding was relatively<br />
infrequent. For example, one pilot analysed bidding behaviour over 15 cycles<br />
and determined that the majority of people bid infrequently. Out of a maximum<br />
of 30 possible bids, it found that only 7 per cent bid more than 20 times and more<br />
than 25 per cent bid only once or twice. Most pilots reported that between 25 and<br />
50 per cent of applicants were bidding at any one time. However, this could have<br />
been a result of lack of suitable properties rather than an unwillingness to bear<br />
the costs of bidding per se.<br />
Outcome of market mechanism<br />
BENEFITS<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Theory suggests that introducing choice could have the effect of increasing<br />
efficiency through both the demand and supply sides of the market. As noted in<br />
Part III, there are three main types of efficiency relevant to our analysis of user<br />
choice, namely allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. The first of these,<br />
allocative efficiency, refers to a situation in which scarce resources are allocated<br />
to the use that society values higher than all other alternative uses. In other<br />
words, resources are allocated in a way that maximises social welfare. In this<br />
situation, no one member of society can be made better off by re-allocating<br />
resources without making another worse off. Productive efficiency is a precondition<br />
<strong>for</strong> allocative efficiency, and is achieved when a specific outcome or<br />
level of output is obtained using the most cost-effective method. Dynamic<br />
efficiency refers to the efficient allocation of resources over time.<br />
Introducing user choice can also lead to increases in social welfare, both by<br />
improving efficiency and by empowering users. Reducing the dependency of<br />
users on housing officials can be beneficial in its own rights, and can improve<br />
customer satisfaction by conferring on users a sense of ownership of the<br />
134 All data in this paragraph taken from Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.136.<br />
135