Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
Public Policy: Using Market-Based Approaches - Department for ...
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
decision. This sense of ownership can also encourage households to take more<br />
responsibility <strong>for</strong> outcomes, by actively participating in the bidding process and<br />
contributing positively to community life once they have secured a property.<br />
CBL pilots appear to have realised all of these potential benefits, although<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance has varied between localities. An example of outcomes from<br />
different schemes is provided in Table 10.9 at the end of this section.<br />
As discussed above, many of the departmental objectives <strong>for</strong> CBL can be viewed<br />
as specific examples of the more general benefits predicted by theory. The<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance of the pilot schemes against these objectives is included in the<br />
following discussion. The objectives identified as being in addition to the<br />
theoretical benefits of choice, however, are not discussed in detail here. They are<br />
not the outcome of a market mechanism per se and, being specific to the<br />
implementation of CBL, do not provide guidance <strong>for</strong> other policy areas wishing<br />
to introduce user choice.<br />
Supply-side benefits<br />
Allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency benefits may be realised through<br />
the supply side if introducing choice fosters per<strong>for</strong>mance-enhancing<br />
competition between social landlords and provides incentives <strong>for</strong> authorities to<br />
run a more consumer-responsive service. As noted previously, it was not an<br />
objective of ODPM or of CBL schemes to encourage competition between social<br />
landlords. However, one objective of CBL was to raise the profile of social<br />
housing in low demand areas, particularly of local authority housing. Raising the<br />
profile of social housing may have stimulated competition between social<br />
landlords involved in CBL and private landlords operating outside the scheme,<br />
leading to sharper incentives <strong>for</strong> quality, efficiency and innovation, although this<br />
was not a direct intention of the scheme. The objective of encouraging<br />
geographical mobility could also theoretically lead to competition <strong>for</strong> applicants<br />
between different local authorities, with similar effects on incentives.<br />
No studies have been conducted to see whether user choice has stimulated<br />
competition between social and private landlords. There is some indirect<br />
evidence of this though: lower demand areas have seen an increased interest in<br />
social housing and higher demand areas have seen a greater willingness of<br />
customers to consider other housing options, including the private sector. 135 It is<br />
unlikely that this competition was sufficient to deliver any of the observed<br />
improvements in productive efficiency, however. The sources of these efficiency<br />
improvements are discussed under administration costs.<br />
Because joint working was an objective of CBL, competition within individual<br />
schemes was minimal. In fact, one officer is reported as commenting that one<br />
benefit of CBL was that it had ‘taken the competition out of lettings’. 136 To some<br />
135 Frances Walker, ODPM.<br />
136 See, Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.132.<br />
136