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DDK HistoryF.p65 - CSIR

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400 CRACKS IN THE MILITARY SYSTEM [10.7<br />

experts was the rule. Yet it was the method whereby Dumouriez and<br />

Keller-mann minced the serried counter-revolutionary armies at Valmy.<br />

It took Goethe to realise that a MW period of world history had been<br />

opened by the cannonade. This was naturally not for the Marathas,<br />

whose armies had overrun India by cause of their<br />

matchless mobility, which was sacrificed to feudal prestige at Panipat.<br />

The Maratha heavy artillery was far too clumsy for handling in the field,<br />

and as great hindrance as the womenfolk. The proposal that both be left<br />

safely in some fort on the way was taken (like every other reasonable<br />

suggestion) as a personal insult and treason by the Peshwa’s commander<br />

Sadashiv Rao Bhaii, who combined feudal and brahmin stupidity with a<br />

short temper that drove away valuable allies. He left the crossing<br />

of the Jumna by the Afghans unopposed because he could not choose to<br />

believe reports that a crossing was being attempted by the adroit Durrani.<br />

The supplies failed simply because the Pendhari loot-foragers were under<br />

the command of a trusty brahmin Govind Pant Bundelay, who had<br />

never seen any reason for keeping guard. He and his Pendhari<br />

captains were cut to pieces during the noonday siesta by a handful<br />

of Afghan scouts after which supplies,for the MarStha army failed<br />

completely. Yet after the disaster at Panipat, the Marathas recovered<br />

strength and morale enough to catch the British in an impossible<br />

position at Talegao, and defeat them at the beginning of 1779. The<br />

entire British contingent was allowed to go after a capitulation at<br />

Vadgao, promptly dishonoured by the East India Company. Yet- the<br />

cracks in the Indian’military system were visible even then. At Talegao,<br />

Mahadji Scindia held the Chief command, but another<br />

division-was under a brahmin trusted by Nana Fadanavis, with the<br />

function, not of supporting Mahadji but keeping watch on the-large<br />

Holkar contingent, suspected of willingness to go over to the other side.<br />

Moreover, though Nana’s espionage system was perfect, and he knew<br />

of every British plan as soon as it was prepared, the steep Deccan.<br />

passes were left undefended, and forced with the<br />

utmost ease. Any defence would have made the Bhor ghat pass<br />

impregnable; the battle need never have reached Talegao at all! The<br />

lesson was never learned, and the British forced Bhor Ghat pass three

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