Left-Extremist Endeavours

Use of intelligence service
staff as members of official
missions and business
enterprises
"Vacuum-cleaning principle"
and long-term source
recruitment
The "Office" has the largest
staff of all PRK representations
in Europe
Existence of residencies at
the "Office" confirmed by
defectors
The primary base of Chinese espionage activities are the legal
residencies at the diplomatic and consular missions where intelligence
service officers work under cover. In addition, however,
use also is made, for intelligence purposes, of airlines, import/export
firms, press agencies, Chinese companies and German/Chinese
joint-venture firms by Chinese intelligence collection
agencies, where intelligence staffers are also employed as
undercover agents.
The aim of the operational activity of the Chinese services -
which, as available intelligence indicates, is oftenbased on a
long-term concept - is to elicit information from interesting people,
to collect all information overtly available - "vacuum-cleaning
principle" - and, ultimately, also to recruit sources. In this regard,
the Chinese services traditionally take an ethnic approach. Primarily,
they will recruit Chinese people living abroad, mostly students,
scientists or businessmen.
2. North Korean Intelligence Services
On account of its chronically straitened financial condition, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (PRK) has, since 1998,
closed down fourteen of its missions abroad and, as a result, has
significantly scaled down its activities regarding procurement of
goods of all types.
While - as before - the PRK does not have diplomatic relations
with the Federal Republic of Germany, it has an interest group
established in Berlin, the Office for the Protection of the Interests
of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic, for which the PR of
China provides diplomatic protection. This interest-representing
office also in 1999 had the largest staff of all North Korean representations
in Europe - which goes to show Germany’s importance
as regards the North Korean procurement efforts in Germany
and Europe, especially with regard to goods subject to
export controls.
In early 1999, it was confirmed once more that North Korea operates
intelligence residencies at its Protection of Interests Office
in Berlin:
On January 13, a member of the North Korean intelligence service
"Unification Front Department" 176) (UFD) who was accredited
as Assistant Secretary at the Berlin "Office", and his wife
entrusted themselves to the protection of the United States of
America.
During the subsequent questioning, the defector confirmed that
there had been such activities.
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