Left-Extremist Endeavours

Procurement methods As regards North Korea’s intelligence collection methods, there
were again efforts at covert transfer of goods subject to export
controls via a third country to North Korea by means of manipulated
declarations regarding the ultimate user or by their export
via a third country.
Unchanged high priority is given to the procurement of goods for
the Second Economic Committee and/or for the People’s Armed
Forces 177) .
Unabated interest in WMD
and the related carrier
technology
Adjustment to strict export
controls
VI. Proliferation
Various countries, primarily in the Near/Middle and Far East -
e.g. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea - for varying motives
endeavour to provide their armed forces with nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons of mass destruction and with the required
long-range vectors. India and Pakistan are at enmity with each
other. Iran strives for hegemony in the Gulf region; other countries
simply wish to avoid being relegated to the background in
military matters. All of them, however, share the unabated strong
interest in owning such weapons of mass destruction and the
related launching systems.
Already decades ago, with the enactment of the War Weapons
Control Act (KWKG) and of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act
(AWG), the Federal Republic of Germany has provided instruments
designed to prevent such countries from making use of
German state-of-the-art technology (high tech) when implementing
their armaments programmes. Both Acts are aligned to
established international legal bases which are aimed at effectively
countering proliferation.
However, countries interested in weapons of mass destruction
have in the meantime adjusted to the strict European export
control mechanisms. Therefore, it is to be expected that their
purchases from Western markets will in future be confined to
urgently needed material that cannot, in the desired quality, be
obtained elsewhere. Also, the methods used in the purchase and
transport of, and payment for, goods of proliferation relevance
are getting more and more clandestine. Moreover, it is to be expected
that the countries directing their efforts at proliferation will
in the near future co-operate even more closely and provide
mutual support. North Korea, for instance, has for some time
presented itself as a co-operation partner in the development of
carrier rockets. Iran is making efforts to build up its own industries
for rocketry-related production - also with the aim of subsequently
selling these products at a profit. For projects, the im-
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