Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself - College of Stoic Philosophers

xlviii INTRODUCTION SECT.
nomy of the 'Wise Man.' Reason, when once its place
in Nature was vindicated and re-established, tended to
become the dominant partner in each exercise of will.
It alone could supply criteria of self-conformity, and
interpret and direct the impulses of sense ;
it alone
could justly pit reduction of needs against surrender
of independence. Thus on all sides it was necessary
to right action, and held, as it were, the casting vote in
the adjustments ,of nature to life. Control came to be
regarded as more important than first momentum, and
thus the very essence of personality and '
nature '
was
found to lie in the dominion of reason. Gradually it
usurped more than mere directive power, and claimed
to decide the prior question of use. It might refuse
assent to any line of movement, and pass sentence of
inertia on any impulse or emotion. At this point the
reversal of original position has become complete. For
in which reason at first had no admitted
the *
nature '
place is now placed wholly at its mercy, and may be set
aside as unauthorised, and in conflict with the mandates
of the premier authority. Nature has become contrary
to nature, and must therefore cease to be. Suppression
of the emotions (a7ra#eia)
a self-determination distinct
from the imperturbability secured by disallowance of
needs takes a cardinal place in the Stoic scheme of
life. And thus, as we shall see, the idea of personality
of the ultimate unity of the individual will and con-
science, of an Ego distinct from physical organism and
environment eventually dawns upon Greek thought,
and unexpectedly reveals a deeper dualism new to
philosophy that antithesis, namely, of spirit and flesh,