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Linguistics Encyclopedia.pdf

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Anyone alive is dead<br />

are false by virtue of the sense relations between the predicates in them. These are called<br />

analytic truths and analytic falsehoods.<br />

Most sentences, of course, are dependent on the state of the world for their truth and<br />

falsehood; for instance,<br />

Socrates is dead<br />

is true because of how things are in the world, and<br />

Socrates is alive<br />

is false because of the way things are in the world. Such sentences are true or false<br />

contingently, synthetically, a posteriori. There is now an obvious temptation to<br />

reduce—or elevate—all contingent sentences to analytic ones; if we could assign to<br />

Socrates the meaning ‘the Greek philosopher who…and who is dead’, then Socrates is<br />

dead, which appears contingent, would be translatable as The Greek philosopher<br />

who…and who is dead is dead, which is logically true. If we could reduce all the terms in<br />

the language to predicates in logical relations to each other, we should be able to show<br />

that the whole language consisted of sentences that were true in virtue of the relations<br />

between the predicates in them. However, unless the language had direct purchase on<br />

reality at some point, it would be useless; and the obvious point at which to connect the<br />

language with reality would, of course, be at the time of renaming Socrates as the Greek<br />

philosopher who…. It would then, in principle, be possible to go into the world and check<br />

the truth of the statement, Socrates is the Greek philospher who…. Of course, we would<br />

need some criteria for having all the properties we were going to claim for Socrates; if,<br />

for instance, we wanted to claim that he was bald as well as dead, we would need to<br />

specify that bald means ‘having no hair’. We’d then check to see if Socrates had hair or<br />

not—once we had discovered some way of identifying hair correctly, etc. We shall<br />

examine problems of this type of procedure on pages 395–8 below.<br />

So far, the binary antonyms we have dealt with have been ungradable. Other pairs,<br />

such as<br />

fast—slow<br />

high—low<br />

sweet—sour<br />

are applicable to things in a more-or-less manner. These are called gradable binary<br />

antonyms, and we can recognize them by the fact that they can be modified by very and<br />

how. It is quite coincidental that there are no linguistic realizations of the stages<br />

intermediate between the pairs of terms. In some cases, indeed, some of the intermediate<br />

stages are realized, as in the case of<br />

hot—warm—cool—cold<br />

The linguistics encyclopedia 526

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