Linguistics Encyclopedia.pdf

precise classifications both of the broad classes and of the subclasses (see, for instance,
Wierzbicka, 1987). Here, however, we shall follow up only Searle’s (1969) development
of Austin’s theory.
Searle (1969) describes utterances slightly differently from Austin’s triad of locution,
illocution, and perlocution. According to Searle, a speaker typically does four things
when saying something; this is because, as Searle rightly points out, not all utterances
involve referring and predicating—Austin’s rheme, which was part of the locutionary act.
For example, ouch and hurrah do not involve rhemes. So the first of Searle’s four
possible elements of uttering only contains Austin’s phone and pheme, that is, it only
includes two of the elements of Austin’s locutionary act. Searle calls this act the
1 Utterance act: uttering words (morphemes, sentences).
Austin’s rheme, the third aspect of the locutionary act, constitutes an element of its own
in Searle’s scheme, the
2 Prepositional act: referring and predicating.
In saying
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(a) Will Peter leave the room?
(b) Peter will leave the room
(c) Peter, leave the room
(d) Would that Peter left the room
a speaker will express the same proposition (symbolized as Rp, where R stands for the
action of leaving the room and p stands for Peter), her or his prepositional act will be the
same, but s/he will be doing other radically different things too in each case. S/he will
perform one of a number of possible
3 Illocutionary acts: questioning, stating, ordering, wishing.
Many utterances contain indicators of illocutionary force, including word order, stress,
punctuation, the mood of the verb, and Austin’s performative verbs. Finally, speaking
typically involves a
4 Perlocutionary act: persuading, getting someone to do something, etc.
Having isolated the acts from each other, in particular having made it possible to separate
the prepositional act from the illocutionary act, Searle is able to home in on the
illocutionary act. To perform illocutionary acts, he says, is to engage in rule-governed
behaviour, and he draws up the rules which govern this behaviour on the basis of sets of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of the various illocutionary acts.
A necessary condition for x is a condition which must be fulfilled before x is
achieved, but which cannot, by itself, necessarily guarantee the achievement of x. For
example, being human is a necessary condition for becoming a lecturer at Birmingham
University, but it is not a sufficient condition; other conditions must be fulfilled too.
A sufficient condition for x is a condition which will guarantee its achievement, but
which need not be a necessary condition. For instance, the entry requirements for a
course of study might state that candidates must either have taught English for fifteen