Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

might leave the land voluntarily, or the owner might succeed in removing him. One
squatter can take advantage of the adverse possession of an earlier squatter to
claim title to the land once the limitation period has expired. 56
This is probably the
case whether the second squatter took possession of the property with the first
squatter’s agreement, or against the first squatter’s will (that is, adverse possession
vis-à-vis both the paper owner and the first squatter). 57
6.22 The act of adverse possession involves two elements: a loss of possession by the
owner and a taking of possession by the squatter. This can happen in one of two
ways, as described by Slade LJ in Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran “(1)
discontinuance by the paper owner followed by possession, or (2) dispossession
(or, as it is sometimes called, ‘ouster’) of the paper owner.” 58
Discontinuance, in
the sense of abandonment, will require proof, and only the slightest acts on the
owner’s part will suffice to establish that use has not been discontinued. 59
6.23 The squatter must have the requisite intention to possess the land, sometimes
known as animus possidendi. 60
This constitutes the intention to exclude the owner as
well as other people. 61
The meaning of animus possidendi was explained by Slade J
in Powell v McFarlane: 62
[T]he animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and
on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner
with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is
reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will
allow. 63
56 Mount Carmel Investments v Peter Thurlow Limited [1988] 1 WLR 1078. See also Willis v Earl
Howe [1893] 2 Ch 545, 553.
57 See, eg K Gray, Elements of Land Law (2nd ed 1993) pp 286 - 287. Cf A McGee, Limitation
Periods (2nd ed 1994), p 211, where it is submitted that, after Mount Carmel, the position is
still unclear where the second squatter has taken adverse possession as against the first
squatter. But if, in this situation, the second squatter is not entitled to aggregate his or her
period of adverse possession with that of the first squatter, it seems strange that the plaintiff
in Mount Carmel needed to rely on a purported assignment of rights from the first squatter
to the plaintiff, as paper owner. Where one squatter dispossesses another time will, of course
run, as between the squatters, from the time of that dispossession: Mount Carmel Investments
v Peter Thurlow Limited [1988] 1 WLR 1078, 1086, per Nicholls LJ.
58 [1990] Ch 623, 635.
59 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, 472, per Slade J. For an example of
discontinuance, see Red House Farms (Thorndon) Ltd v Catchpole [1977] 2 EGLR 125
(CA).
60 See, eg, Buckinghamshire CC v Moran [1990] 1 Ch 623, 636, per Slade LJ. The intention of
the owner is in itself irrelevant, although the court may take the squatter’s knowledge of the
owner’s intentions into account in deciding whether the squatter has animus possidendi: ibid,
644 - 645, per Nourse LJ.
61 Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, 23, per Lindley MR.
62 (1979) 38 P & CR 452, 471 - 472.
63 See paras 6.29 - 6.31 below in relation to the acts which may be sufficient to demonstrate
the necessary intention.
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