Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

13.143 This protection was not complete - although the statute applied to criminal
prosecutions and most actions for civil wrongs it did not, for example, apply to
actions for breach of contract. 194
In addition, the Act did not apply to cases under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 195
(and its successors which provided
compensation for industrial injuries before the advent of the National Insurance
(Industrial Injuries) Act 1946), and it appears that it did not apply to actions
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (and its successors). 196
13.144 The operation of the 1893 Act was reviewed by the Law Revision Committee. 197
It noted that
We have carefully considered how far it is advisable to interfere with the
policy of the Public Authorities Protection Act. That policy is quite clear,
namely, to protect absolutely the acts of public officials, after a very short
lapse of time, from challenge in the courts. It may well be that such a
policy is justifiable in the case of important administrative acts, and that
serious consequences might ensue if such acts could be impugned after a
long lapse of time. But the vast majority of cases in which the Act has been
relied upon are cases of negligence of municipal tram drivers or medical
officers and the like, and there seems no very good reason why such cases
should be given special treatment merely because the wrongdoer is paid
from public funds. 198
13.145 Though the Report did not recommend the repeal of the Public Authorities
Protection Act 1893, it did recommend that its effects should be mitigated in two
respects, namely that the limitation period should be extended from six months to
one year, and that the period should run from the date of the accrual of the cause
of action, rather than the date of the “act, neglect or default complained of.”
These recommendations were implemented in section 21 of the Limitation Act
1939.
13.146 The Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 was given further consideration in the
Report of the Committee on the Limitation of Actions in 1949. 199
It said:
We approach the problem from the point of view that the special period of
limitation and the special provisions as to the payment of costs which were
fixed for the benefit of public authorities by the Act of 1893 are a
curtailment of the rights of the individual and can only be justified if it is
194 See Sharpington v Fulham Guardians [1904] 2 Ch 449, though see also Lyles v Southern
Corporation [1905] 2 KB 1.
195 See Fry v Cheltenham Corporation [1911] 81 LJKB 41.
196 See British Electric Company, Ltd v Gentile [1914] AC 1034 and Venn v Tedesco [1926] 2 KB
227.
197 In the Fifth Interim Report “Statutes of Limitation” 1936, Cmd 5334.
198 See para 26.
199 Chaired by Lord Justice Tucker, Cmd 7740.
370