Limitation of Actions Consultation - Law Commission

in connection with the provision of the dwelling does further work to rectify the
work he has already done, any such cause of action in respect of that further work
shall be deemed for those purposes to have accrued at the time when the further
work was finished”. Such a starting point for these claims would assist the
plaintiff, as it would in most cases be later than the date of the actual act or
omission which gave rise to the defect. It would also avoid the need to investigate
precisely when the relevant act or omission took place, and may provide more
certainty for both the plaintiff and the defendant (though this may not be so if
certificates of practical completion are not being used). 147
The Law Reform
Committee considered the use of the date of completion of works as a trigger for
the long stop period in all cases of latent damage (except personal injury), but
noted “we can see formidable difficulties is adapting the concept of completion to
all the types of circumstances ... where latent damage might arise”. 148
It may be
difficult to apply “completion of the works” as a starting point for the limitation
period to any claims other than “construction liability claims”. It would therefore
be necessary to identify with precision what is meant by “construction liability
claims”. In general we foresee problems of demarcation if a special limitation
provision is introduced for a particular industry. It would also detract from the
uniformity of our core regime. However, we recognise the force of the argument
that “completion of the works” may provide additional certainty in “construction
liability claims” and, in terms of our proposals for a long-stop, it could be regarded
as the deemed date of the defendant’s act or omission for such claims.
12.107 Use of the date on which the cause of action accrues as the starting point for the
long-stop period would reintroduce the incoherence and complexity caused by the
different rules on the date of accrual for different causes of action. Moreover, it
would appear to destroy the purpose of a long-stop in that defendants would not
be protected where the cause of action accrues many years after the date of the
defendant’s act or omission, as where damage from negligence does not occur for a
long period. The introduction of a long-stop limitation period is, we believe,
necessary to balance the pro-plaintiff change implicit in the general adoption of
the date of discoverability as the starting point for the initial limitation period. It is
therefore appropriate that the interests of defendants should be preferred over
those of plaintiffs in fixing the starting point for the long-stop limitation period.
12.108 Our provisional view is that, if there is to be a long-stop under the core
regime, it should run from the date of the act or omission of the defendant
which gives rise to the claim. We ask consultees whether they agree. We
also ask consultees whether, for construction liability claims, the date of
the act or omission of the defendant should be deemed to be the date of
completion of the works, and, if so, how “construction liability claims”
should be defined.
147 We note that the Official Referee, consulted by the Law Reform Committee during the
preparation of their Twenty-Fourth Report on Latent Damage did not favour the use of a
completion date test. See R Merkin, Richards Butler on Latent Damage (1987) p 96.
148 Twenty-Fourth Report (Latent Damage) (1984) Cmnd 9390, para 4.12.
288